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AN ANALYSIS OF GAULLIST FOREIGN POLICY  
GOALS AND THEIR AFFECTS UPON  
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

R. CLIFTON JONES, JR.













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Submitted to the  
Faculty of the School of International Service  
of The American University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
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AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE

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H. CLIFFORD JONES, Jr.

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## ABSTRACT

The collapse of the Common Market talks in Brussels in January, 1963, signaled the beginning of a new era in relationships among the Atlantic partners of the NATO alliance. The nature of the alliance had changed since its formation in 1949; and France, the leader of the "new" Europe, demanded a larger role in policy formulation and direction.

This thesis explores the evolution of de Gaulle's goals for France in Europe and vis-à-vis the Atlantic alliance. The relationship of these goals shows that the Atlantic policies of de Gaulle cannot be divorced from his European policies.

If NATO is to continue as an effective force, it must have France as a member. The price of French participation is a remodeled NATO. It may not be feasible to meet all French objections with changes, but, in the light of current realities, NATO is long over due for a reorganization.

## APPENDIX

The collapse of the system which has been in operation since January, 1945, required the adoption of a new one in its place. The Atlantic Charter of the NATO alliance, which was the basis of the system, has been replaced by the Atlantic Charter of the NATO alliance. The Charter of the Atlantic Charter, which was the basis of the system, has been replaced by the Atlantic Charter of the NATO alliance. The Charter of the Atlantic Charter, which was the basis of the system, has been replaced by the Atlantic Charter of the NATO alliance.

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## PREFACE

With the collapse of the Common Market talks in January, 1963, in Brussels, almost everyone in Great Britain and the United States experienced a reaction that was more emotional than objective. The brutal and arbitrary manner in which Great Britain was denied a place in Europe made it apparent that for France, Britain's entry at that time (or indeed within the near foreseeable future) was not part of the de Gaulle view of the developing "new" Europe. The press conference of President de Gaulle on January 14, 1963, did more than just block Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and Europe. It was also the most direct and serious challenge to the Atlantic alliance and the Anglo-American relationship in NATO since the creation of the Fifth Republic. The slamming of the door to Great Britain was, in de Gaulle's view, a summary denial of the expansion and extension to the European Communities of American influence and hegemony.

In the period immediately following the French veto, many explanations were advanced to account for the actions of de Gaulle. To some, they were easily explained by the dislike of the "Anglo-Saxons" by the General, by his feeling of wounded pride at his shabby treatment by these powers during World War II, and by his desire for personal glory.

With the collapse of the Communist Party in

January, 1961, in Russia, almost everyone in West Berlin

and the United States considered a Russian Party was

essential for stability. The British and American

in West Berlin were aware of a plan in Moscow to

agreement that the Russian, Russian's party at that time for

indeed which has been increasingly feared was not part of

for the British view of the developing Soviet Union. The

great conference on treatment of Berlin on January 14, 1961,

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division of the Anglo-American by the General, by his feeling

of wounded pride at the Soviet's treatment of those powers

during World War II, and by his desire for personal glory.

Others more accurately attributed his motives to no such base considerations but rather to his realistic evaluation of the political, military, and economic realities of the situation which confronted France and Europe. De Gaulle acted in a manner he believed was best for French interests, European interests, and in the long run, the best interests of the British. By his January maneuver and labeling of Great Britain as "not being European," he sought to drive a wedge in the special relationship that exists between the United States and Great Britain, and which finds its greatest expression in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Great Britain had to choose whether she preferred to maintain her relationship with the United States or come into Europe at the price of severing this umbilical tie.

The machinations of President de Gaulle raised many questions concerning the NATO alliance and its probable future. The more important questions concerned themselves with the goal which de Gaulle is seeking to attain for France in Europe and vis-à-vis the rest of the world. From this follows the next and more important question, with which this paper will be most concerned: how will this future role de Gaulle envisions France playing affect the NATO alliance, France's participation in the alliance, and to what extent will the means used to attain this end impinge upon the alliance?



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upon the alliance?



To keep the discussion as simple as possible and not become too enmeshed in the various points of discussion regarding the personality of the leading protagonist, President de Gaulle, this aspect of the study has been kept in the background as much as possible. While there are many fascinating and provocative features in the personality of the French President, it is felt that any discussion here would only be deleterious to the study and add little to whatever merit the French case might have.

In trying to ascertain the exact nature of the goal sought by de Gaulle for France in Europe, if indeed such a thing has been formulated even in his mind, it seemed not too illogical to examine what he has said and written in the past on this subject. From his past actions, it seems that what he says he "desires" for France is, in fact, what he intends to see implemented. At this point, it should be mentioned that of all de Gaulle's seeming faults and personality quirks, he is not noted for any real measure of inconsistency or disparity between his stated objectives and his efforts to achieve what he regards as France's "rightful" position of power and grandeur in the world.

In addition to the works of Charles de Gaulle, great emphasis was placed upon United States governmental publications, where available, to obtain a balanced view of the U. S. alliance policy in regard to the Gaullist goals.

[illegible]

These publications were also a great source of basic information on the alliance and intra-allied relations.

Supplementing these sources were many publications of the NATO Information Service, Paris and, of course, voluminous books and periodicals listed under "Secondary Sources" in the bibliography.

After reading the de Gaulle Memoirs and many of his other works and speeches, it seems incongruous just how statesmen in the United States and the United Kingdom could fail to recognize and understand the designs and motives of the French President. Perhaps it was wishful thinking, when his professions of intent were clearly set out years ago, that he lacked the requisite means to achieve his ends. Thus, he was disregarded save for the difficulty his intransigent attitude caused. That his statements were not frivolous and his power to implement them is real was clearly seen in his rejection of the British at Brussels. If de Gaulle did not believe he had the power to stop Great Britain's entry, he would never have attempted his move in opposition to the other members of the European Economic Community. If his power were only de jure, that given him in the Rome Treaty's veto provision on new members, and not de facto, embodied in the belief of many Europeans that his course of action was correct, though harsh, there would not



These politicians were also a great source of help. In the  
 nation of the alliance and later allied nations.  
 Examining these sources were many politicians of  
 the NATO Organization, and, of course, various  
 other nations and political leaders. It was very common  
 in the geography.

After reading the State of the Union and many of his  
 other works and speeches, it seems important that he  
 speak in the United States and the United States could  
 tell us something and understand the things and history of  
 the French President. There is one other thing, when  
 his presence of affairs were clearly and one year ago,  
 that he faced the republicans and to achieve his goal.  
 Then, he was disappointed even for the difficulty his future  
 ahead would be. That his statements were not clear  
 and his power to influence them in fact was clearly  
 seen in his rejection of the idea of Russia. It is  
 clear that he believed he had the power to show them  
 his way, so would have been satisfied with the way in  
 position in the other nations of the European countries  
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 of the, especially in the matter of many countries and his  
 course of action was correct, though many, there would not

have been the intense, vociferous attacks made against de Gaulle on a personal level.

Exploring the many constituent elements underlying the Gaullist goals, their evolution, and interaction with the Atlantic Alliance led to the division of this work into six chapters. The first chapter explores the goals which de Gaulle has in mind for France and how they have evolved and presented themselves in French policy in the years after World War II. The maturation process and refinement of these Gaullist aims and their relation, specifically, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after de Gaulle's recall in 1958, is treated in Chapter II. The relationship of de Gaulle's European aims and their interrelation with his "Atlantic" policy is covered in Chapter III.

The Gaullist aims and their conflict with United States policy, specifically directed toward United States NATO policy in the 1960's and later, is the theme of Chapter IV. This chapter also covers the interaction between the United States and her agreement with Great Britain at Nassau and the collapse of the Common Market negotiations at Brussels. The fifth chapter deals with the affects which the Gaullist goals for France will have upon the NATO alliance, which as a point of fact, to a certain extent have been indicated in previous chapters out of necessity. The final chapter is a summary and conclusions.





## CHAPTER I

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE GAULLIST GOAL FOR FRANCE

France emerged from the Second World War beset by weakness, fears, and even a sense of humiliation at having been liberated, after her bitter and complete defeat in 1940, by the coalition of the "Anglo-Saxons." She was, in 1944 and 1945, a distraught nation which, as had the other occupied countries of Europe, been weakened by Nazi exploitation and occupation, and the ravages of her liberation. Her future prospects for participation in the postwar world and in the councils of the Great Powers was an uncertain and seemingly unanswerable question. It was difficult to visualize France's future role in this coming era and just how much of a factor she would be in the developing new power balance. Certainly there was great doubt, especially among her allies, whether she would ever regain her former status as a Great Power. Such thoughts, if present, however, never were allowed to cloud the expressions of France's ultimate wartime leader, who, in that period of travail made himself into the living symbol of France, General Charles Andre Joseph Marie de Gaulle. The basic tenets and policies of this man are embodied in the phrase, "DeGaulle is France."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Stanley F. Clark, The Man Who is France: The Story





General de Gaulle is in his manner of action and personality an unusual man; even for a statesman he is a most controversial figure. Volumes could be devoted to the variegated aspects of his character, personality, and ability; but this is not the place for such an evaluation. Suffice it to note that the carefully-cultivated aura of "mystique" and aloofness with which he surrounds himself, are not wholly incomprehensible if one but reads the writings of this man and lends a little credence to what he says are his values. In his book, The Edge of the Sword, a treatise on war, de Gaulle observes that, ". . . there can be no prestige without mystery, for familiarity breeds contempt."<sup>2</sup> Thus, the "mystique" of de Gaulle is the same "mystique" that he transfers to France in her search for prestige under his tutelage.

On the subject of leaders, a category in which he unquestionably belongs and about which he can speak with no little authority, he is as direct in his evaluation.

Aloofness, character, and the personification of greatness, these qualities it is that surround with prestige those who are prepared to carry a burden which is too heavy for lesser mortals.<sup>3</sup>

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of General Charles de Gaulle (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963), p. 233.

<sup>2</sup>Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, trans. Gerhard Hopkins (New York: Criterion Books, 1960), p. 58.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

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de Gaulle, Charles de Gaulle (New York: Doubt, Knoll and  
 Company, 1951), p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, trans.  
 Bernard Newman (New York: Citation Books, 1950), p. 28.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

While this may sound pompous to many Americans, it is none the less a very real factor in the General's beliefs.

There is one characteristic of General de Gaulle's personality that stands out more clearly against the background of the Common Market talks which ended so dramatically on January 14<sup>th</sup> of this year; this is his consistency of stated purpose and action. He has for years, quite vociferously, stated his visions for France and the role which he seeks to attain for her.

#### I. THE EARLY PERIOD

In his wartime speeches, there is a continuum of thought and feeling, sometimes expressed, sometimes only hinted, but always present, that France was great and will be great again for it is her destiny as the natural leader of civilized peoples. The concepts of French unity, power, and prestige run "like a red thread" through his speeches of the 1940-1945 period.<sup>4</sup>

The differences between de Gaulle and the Western allies during World War II arose more or less over these same sentiments. De Gaulle believed the American and British leaders paid too little heed to the French desire to

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<sup>4</sup>Donald C. McKay, The United States and France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 253.





be recognized and understood. The leader of the Free French, however, demanded more recognition of the efforts and sacrifices of his forces, more than was warranted in the opinion of the Western leaders. Against the iniquities he felt were present within the Western alliance, de Gaulle, on occasion, gave vent to his feelings. At such times, there was usually present in his speeches a veiled allusion to the future role which France was bound to play in the postwar era, by reason of her destiny and her past historic position. The comments he made in 1944 are not too dissimilar from those he was to utter at a later period, in the 1950's, regarding another alliance, NATO. In his address in Algiers, March 18, 1944, de Gaulle, lamented France's role in the present conduct of world affairs by the Western Powers and stated:

The conditions in which the government is placed do not permit it to have in relation to other great powers, a hearing proportionate to its sacred obligations.

On this difficult question the government's policy is to make itself heard and understood, despite the many obstacles, by bringing the greatest possible cooperation to the common effort, and to maintain entire reserve as to the position of France, in matters which concern her where attempts are made to solve problems without her.<sup>5</sup>

De Gaulle continued, pointing out what was to him

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<sup>5</sup> Charles de Gaulle, Two Speeches by General Charles de Gaulle (New York: France Forever, 1944), p. 17.

by the United States and the United Kingdom. The leaders of the Free French, however, demanded more recognition of the efforts and sacrifices of his forces, more than was warranted in the opinion of the Western leaders. Indeed the insistence on this score proved within the Western Alliance, as De Gaulle, as commander, gave rise to his feelings. At such times, there was usually present in the speeches a veiled allusion to the French role which France was bound to play in the future war. By reason of our position and our past historic position. The demands we made in 1944 are not too dissimilar from those we are now making as a free people. In the 1950's, regarding ourselves, we are no longer in Africa, where in 1944, we had, indeed, played a role in the present conflict as well as in the past French Empire and Africa.

The conditions in which the government is placed do not permit it to have in relation to other great powers, a position proportionate to its actual capabilities.

On this difficult question the government's policy is to make itself heard and understood, despite the many obstacles, by bringing the greatest possible cooperation to the common effort, and to maintain entire fidelity to the position of France, in matters which concern her where attempts are made to solve problems without her.

On De Gaulle's position, pointing out what was to him

Source: De Gaulle, The Personality of General Charles de Gaulle (New York: French Embassy, 1957), p. 11.



France's obvious and necessary role in the Europe of the postwar years.

Europe exists, conscious of what she is worth to mankind in the aggregate and certain of emerging from the sea of her sufferings, of reappearing, wiser for her trials and ready to undertake constructive work of a material, intellectual and moral nature for the reorganization of the world. This she is eminently capable of doing. . . . Then the action, the influence, in one word the value of France will become necessary to Europe according to the dictates of history, geography and plain common sense - for its guidance, for the renewal of its relations with the rest of the world.<sup>6</sup>

Even at such an early date and at such a tumultuous time in the course of world events, de Gaulle allowed himself to expand upon France's position in that Europe of the future postwar period, made more civilized by French presence, power, and leadership.

But in order that the old Continent, once renovated, may attain a balance that corresponds to modern conditions, it would seem that certain groupings of nations should be formed, without, of course, their encroaching on the sovereignty of any of the states. As regards France, we believe that a sort of Western European grouping achieved with us, primarily on an economic basis and as broadly as possible, would be highly advantageous.<sup>7</sup>

This "grouping" envisioned by de Gaulle would have worked in close cooperation with the Asian and African states (at the time, 1944, France expected to regain her possessions in Southeast Asia and North Africa and retain them). What is interesting here is the delimitation of the

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-21.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

Y

Yusuf's physical and monetary role in the struggle of the

country.

Yusuf's role, however, was not to be seen in the light of a simple man in the struggle and certain of seeing the  
the end of his struggle, of responsibility, and for  
his role and ready to undertake constructive work  
of a national, intellectual and moral nature for the  
responsibility of the world. This is the only  
approach to the world. . . . Thus the nation, the testimony  
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world.

Even at such an early date and at such a tumultuous  
time in the course of world events, he had allowed him-  
self to remain upon Yusuf's position in that Europe of the  
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highly advantageous.

This "grouping" mentioned by the author would have  
worked in close cooperation with the Asian and African  
states and the West, 1944. Yusuf expected to remain in  
possession in Western Asia and North Africa and within  
them. . . . There is no necessary need for the delegation of the



pivotal point of this "grouping" about which he stated, ". . . the Channel, the Rhine, and the Mediterranean would act as arteries, would constitute an important center in the world organization of production, exchange and security."<sup>8</sup> These "arteries" broadly bound France on the West, South, and Northeast; and thus it would appear that what de Gaulle meant when he referred to a "Western European grouping achieved with us" was really to be interpreted as a Western European grouping "under French leadership."

These ideas, voiced in an era of uncertainty, have been modified by the press of events and the passage of time, but they still are, in the main, the expression of de Gaulle's wish to restore France to a position of greatness in a world that has two super-powers at swords point. To de Gaulle, France's glory in its past lay in its humanizing ability. Her greatness in building her Empire was measured in terms of how well she was able to aid the development of the underdeveloped peoples.<sup>9</sup>

The belief that de Gaulle sought to return France to the position of power she allegedly possessed in the pre-World War II period, does not appear to this writer to be a supportable argument. The Gaullist concept of France and

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 21. [Italics added.]

<sup>9</sup>Clark, op. cit., p. 235.



the greatness of her past, would not lead him to seek for France a return to the time where she was not truly proud, where she was more of a follower than a leader, and in which she suffered from a false psychological sense of security furnished by that folie de sécurité, the Maginot line. The France that de Gaulle sought was more comparable to that of France of the 1920's. Victorious over the Boche (but at what a terrible cost to her future in the loss of her manhood and vitality), economically sound, and with supposedly the strongest armed force on the continent, she was the greatest power in Europe and one of the world's leading states. While the facts of later years would belie the notion of this picture of France, the feeling at the time was one of strength and this was what de Gaulle sought to recapture for his France.

## II. SECURITY AS A BASE FOR FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

Security has always played a very important part, if not the most important part, in forming a base for French foreign policy. It is as true today as it was in 1945 or in 1918. The great tradition of French foreign policy, as Jules Cambon stated, ". . . cared only for France; it was essentially conservative, circumspect, deliberate."<sup>10</sup> The

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<sup>10</sup>Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign







traditional aims of France center about her search for security, "and what is this but the maintenance of peace?"<sup>11</sup>

France, in the pursuit of her security, put her trust in military power because of her open frontiers in the North and East which were invitations to invasion. The military power which she sought, M. Cambon points out, was not, however, that of the aggressive Napoleon with his grandiose schemes for France. These went beyond France's frontiers and thus "broke through all the traditional limits of French policy."<sup>12</sup>

Security, M. Cambon emphasized, is much more than keeping free the motherland or the overseas territories.

It also means the maintenance of the world's respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything, in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of the nation. But all peoples have not the same ideal; each follows what it considers to be its national interests in accordance with its own traditions. If nations are to live in peace, those who direct the foreign affairs of each state must try diligently and long to understand and respect the aspirations of others. For by a statesman's comprehension of the factors which direct the destiny of nations one measures the breadth and depth of his genius.<sup>13</sup>

This last thought would seem to be especially valid today as an evaluation of the needs of statesmen on both

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Policy," The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 113.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 118.



sides of the Atlantic to understand each other's position within the framework of our present associations; i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In line with her search for security, France sought to regain her former power and greatness. A precursor of later efforts in this direction occurred during the early phases of World War II when the French Committee-in-Exile was established. Its first efforts were directed toward gaining recognition by the allies as the representative voice of France and a full-scale ally so as to be able to share in the decisions affecting the conduct of the war and of the peace. The Committee had two very basic demands which it claimed in the name of French sovereignty. The first was the re-establishment of France in all of her former rights and possessions. The second was participation by France on an equal footing with the other allies in formulating policies regarding the defeated Axis powers. As soon as France and Paris were cleared of German forces in 1944, the de Gaulle Provisional Government lost no time in seeking to implement their policy of gaining recognition for France as one of the world's great powers.<sup>14</sup> "Only by being

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<sup>14</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "The Twilight of French Foreign Policy," The Yale Review, XLIV (September, 1954), 70.







admitted to the Councils of the mighty could France participate in decisions vitally affecting her."<sup>15</sup>

### III. BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST

Partially as a result of his wartime efforts to achieve a position of equality for France among the allies and restoration as a Great Power, and partially because he believed that France was not herself and could not exist as herself without the status of a first-rank power, de Gaulle's Provisional Government sought to justify her claim to a position of grandeur and power. "To my mind, France cannot be France without greatness."<sup>16</sup> Economically weak and with her historical claim to past glory tarnished by her defeat in 1940 and the humiliation of the Vichy submission, France, during the immediate postwar period, attempted to remain aloof from both the East and the West - to act as a mediator, a bridge as it were between the two opposing entities, linked to both but committed to neither.

M. Charles Bidault stated his government's position quite clearly in November, 1944.

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<sup>15</sup>Elizabeth Davey (ed.), France in Crisis (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1957), p. 95.

<sup>16</sup>Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, The Call to Honor 1940-1942, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), p. 9.

made in previous years is reflected below:

[illegible]

W. CHURCHILL, *University of Cambridge*

22. Elizabetta Murray (1841), Wife of John Murray (1841)

<sup>10</sup>Cherise de Caille, The People's Choice, New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1968.

It is necessary for France to be able to participate in the conference of the Great Powers, especially the European Advisory Council, because the fate and security of Europe cannot be decided without France. . . . I believe France can play a valuable part in forming a bridge between the East and West, . . . to insure the security of France we are prepared to conclude pacts which would be in the interest of France's and European security. But her own security does not rest on the Atlantic side only.<sup>17</sup>

This position was made official in a succinct summation by M. Bidault at the first debate of the French Consultative Assembly in the same month. "An alliance with the West? Of course. How could we do otherwise? But an alliance with the East also. France will never permit herself to be limited to the Western part of the world."<sup>18</sup> This was as explicit a statement of the French search for security and independence as could be desired. It was also a declaration that she would remain undictated to and would achieve this position by pursuing her own policies between the East and West.

The unfriendly relations and hard feelings which had existed between de Gaulle's France and the allies toward the end of the war, reinforced the natural historic tendency of the French to insure her security in Europe by the conclusion of a pact with the East. The states of the Little

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<sup>17</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. V, 1943-1946 (London: Keesing's Publication Limited), pp. 6807-8.

<sup>18</sup>Davey, op. cit., pp. 95-96.



It is necessary for France to be able to participate in the conference on the Middle East, especially the League of Nations, because the Arab and Jewish communities in the Middle East are in a delicate position. It is necessary for France to be able to participate in the conference on the Middle East, especially the League of Nations, because the Arab and Jewish communities in the Middle East are in a delicate position. It is necessary for France to be able to participate in the conference on the Middle East, especially the League of Nations, because the Arab and Jewish communities in the Middle East are in a delicate position.

This position was also official in a recent statement by M. Blum at the first session of the French Assembly in the same month. "An alliance with the East, of course, the kind we do not desire, but an alliance with the East also, France will never permit herself to be limited to the Western part of the world." This was an explicit statement of the French policy for the future and independence as could be deduced. It was also a declaration that the world would remain undivided by any such alliance. This position by pursuing her own policies between the East and West.

The friendly relations and good feelings which had existed between the British Empire and the allies toward the end of the war, reinforced the natural historic tendency of the French to insure her security in Europe by the conclusion of a pact with the East. The words of the British



Entente had fallen under the spell of the Soviet "liberators," and this meant that any Eastern alliance would have to follow pre-World War I lines in an agreement with Russia. The conclusion of an alliance with the U.S.S.R. in December, 1945, against another German menace, was not only in keeping with past French diplomatic tradition, but it was also de Gaulle's way of taking the steps he felt were necessary to assure French independence of action in the postwar period. As de Gaulle stated in the fall of 1945:

In the world as it is today, there are two very great powers, and we lie exactly between them - the extremity of Europe toward the West, the bridgehead of Europe with the East! We have only to look at the map to understand that in this situation, our vital interests command us to hold a rigorous balance.

In the measure that it depends on us, therefore, we propose to follow a policy of friendship to the East and to the West, with our eyes open and our hands free . . . we know that our balance is identical with the balance of peace, and we are fully decided not to abandon it, certain that after various oscillations, it is our own attitude which will finally determine the balance of the needle for the good of all.<sup>19</sup>

The France-Russian Alliance of 1945, however, lost much of its force and political potency for it was obvious that Germany would be unable for some considerable time to menace anyone. It succeeded only partially in freeing the Provisional Government of France, and subsequent governments,

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<sup>19</sup>McKay, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

Colombia and France under the terms of the "Colombia-  
 and this means that any French attempt would have to follow  
 the United States I think in an agreement with France. The com-  
 mission of an alliance with the United States in December, 1945,  
 against another French member, was not only in keeping with  
 the French Republic's tradition, but it was also in the United  
 way of seeing the steps in the future necessary to ensure  
 French independence of action in the future period. It is  
 again seen in the fall of 1945.

In the words of the United States, France was not very  
 great power, and we are clearly between them - the  
 authority of France toward the world, the independence  
 of France with the United States. We have only to look at  
 the map to understand that in this situation, and  
 that the United States is not a French member.

In the meantime, that is, in the United States, we  
 are prepared to follow a policy of friendship to the  
 East and to the West, with our eyes open and our  
 hands free. . . . We have tried and failed to identify  
 our ally and ally of peace, and we are fully  
 decided not to abandon it, certainly that after years  
 our coalition, is as our own ally which will  
 finally determine the balance of the world for the  
 good of all.

The French-United States alliance of 1945, however, 1945  
 was of the force and political nature for it was obvious  
 that Germany would be unable for some considerable time to  
 make any move. It was not only in the United States  
 Provincial Government of France, and subsequent governments,

and allowing them to pursue policies solely of their own choosing.

The fissures that had existed in the wartime alliance between the East and West developed into a wide chasm by 1947. The gap which France had sought to bridge had grown so large between the two blocs that France, lacking the domestic strength to pursue her international schemes, was drawn back into the Western coalition from which she had really never strayed very far. De Gaulle had sought goals for France which were unattainable in the chaotic world that existed after the end of hostilities in World War II and which were, with France's extremely limited power, impossible of achievement. In 1946, King Haakon of Norway observed:

All the Continental lands were seeking French leadership to unite them as a bloc between the two extra-European super-powers; but deGaulle blindly ignored this chance. He insisted on playing a global role that France's energies were unable to fulfill.<sup>20</sup>

Contributing to France's continued Western ties was the domestic factor of the communist threat which made it imperative that France bolster her economy to serve as a bulwark against internal communist attacks which were tearing the country apart. The only power capable of such aid to France was the United States. France's economic and

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<sup>20</sup>Davey, op. cit., p. 81.



and allowing them to govern without any of their own  
 choosing.  
 The situation also was related to the economic situation  
 between the East and West developed from a state of  
 1947. The two sides were not equal in terms of power  
 to have between the two sides. The situation was  
 changed through to power and international relations was  
 done with the world coalition from which the  
 really have played very far. The world and world  
 for France which was necessary in the world world  
 existed after the war as a result of the war and  
 which were with France's economic and political power, in-  
 stitute of administration. In 1946, the power of France  
 ended.

All the countries were not taking from  
 leadership to take from a state which was the  
 state-union system, but the world's kind  
 ignored this power. It was not at all a global  
 role for France's position was made to be  
 Confirmed to France's position which was  
 the power of the world which was the  
 imperative that France could not allow to be  
 subject to international relations which was the  
 for the country itself. The way power could be used  
 in France was the world power. France's power was



military weakness, together with her cultural past, historic position, geographical situation, political beliefs, and spiritual values, brought the French into a closer association and dependence upon the United States and to a lesser extent, Great Britain. The fact that France stayed with the West was not due to any deliberate political choice but simply because she is of the West.

Soviet intransigence and aggressive moves in Eastern Europe in 1945-1947 and the coup in Prague in 1948 made the fact of rearmament for France a pressing necessity, not only to the Anglo-Saxon West, but also to France and Western Europe. The rapid expansion of her armed forces naturally resulted in a large drain upon her already overburdened economy and forced France into a position of even greater dependence upon the one country which was able to meet her growing needs, the United States.

Thus, as the cold war grew warmer in the late 1940's, France found it necessary, out of sheer need and dependence, to follow the lead of the United States in the struggle with communism, to strengthen her ties with the West, and to base her policies upon United States policy lines. This dependence, was humiliating to all groups within the French political spectrum. The resentment they felt over her inability to return to the de facto position she had occupied as a Great Power, and the humiliation at being accorded de

alliance, economic, political and cultural, and  
 other political, geographical, historical, political, and  
 other factors, through the French and a close  
 relation and dependence upon the United States and to a  
 large extent, close political, the French French ally  
 with the West was not to any extent political union  
 but simply because she is of the West.

United States, and aggressive power in Europe  
 since 1914-1918 and the end in 1918-1919 and  
 fact of Germany for France a pressing necessity, not only  
 to the English West, but also to France and Britain  
 Europe. The fact of the end of the French empire  
 resulted in a large state upon which already concentrated  
 economy and forced France into a position of even greater  
 dependence upon the country which was not to West but  
 growing needs, the United States.

Thus, as the war was over in the late 1918,  
 France found it necessary, out of sheer need and dependence,  
 to follow the lead of the United States in the Atlantic and  
 economic, to strengthen her ties with the West, and to form  
 her political and cultural policy lines. This began  
 and, was resulting in all French within the French  
 political system. The result was that the French  
 relation to France to the French position she had occupied  
 as a great power, and the position as being occupied as

jure recognition in the United Nations as one of the Big Five, through the efforts of the "Anglo-Saxons," was fed by the continued closeness which the latter group exhibited. The two leading nationalists in France at this time, General de Gaulle and M. Charles Bidault, were grieved at the way the Anglo-American relationship had matured and broadened after the end of World War II. They felt that this special relationship was carried over into the peacetime period against the best interests of France (and, therefore, Europe), which was, they believed, being relegated to a position of a second-rank power in the Western coalition.

#### IV. DOMESTIC FACTORS

On the domestic scene, the Gaullist Party, the RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Francais) or Rally of the French People, which was launched by de Gaulle in April, 1947, was violently anti-communist ("Separatists") in its orientation. This Party, or Union, drew together a motley crew of conservative industrialists, old guard officers, plus a mass following of the conservative petty bourgeois. The cohesive elements which bound this conglomerate group of political outlooks together, was their shared anti-communist and strong nationalistic feeling. Additionally, they all shared the belief ". . . that de Gaulle himself was the grandeur of



the Commission in the United States is not as yet  
 fifty. Although the efforts of the American Commission, and the  
 the continued discussion which has taken place recently  
 the two leading organizations in France at this time, General  
 de Gaulle and M. Charles de Gaulle, were guided in the way  
 the Anglo-American relationship was formed and broken  
 there are two of them who are. They have this special  
 relationship was created over the two leading parties  
 against the best interests of France (and, of course, Europe)  
 when they were created, being regarded as a political party  
 which came over to the French position.

## IV. DOMESTIC FACTORS

On the domestic scene, the British party, the  
 Government of the Anglo-American relationship of the French  
 people, which was founded on the basis in April, 1941, was  
 violently anti-communist (especially in the resistance,  
 this party, as well, were created a policy of common-  
 sense, mutual interest, and good relations, plus a well-  
 founded of the conservative party Bourgeois. The conservative  
 elements which would also have been a group of officials  
 outside the party, who were created anti-communist and  
 these anti-communist feeling. Similarly, they all agreed  
 the basis of... that the British himself was a member of



France."<sup>21</sup> Basically, however, the RPF was a "union above parties" dedicated to rescuing the Fourth Republic from the "tyranny of politics." While it lacked a specific program, its members believed that only such a Rally, under strong executive leadership (de Gaulle's) could unite France, recapture the national power of France and eliminate the "separatists."<sup>22</sup> The RPF was, thus, essentially not a political party; "it was the national conscience; it was France."<sup>23</sup> The Gaullists believed that the "mystique" of nationalism and the personal "mystique" of their leader would forge this group into a formidable force on the French political scene.

Failing to implement his plans for France to stand between the East and West, and unable to control the dissident elements within his government, de Gaulle resigned in 1946 as President of the Provisional Government, and went into retirement to await the call of the French people.

That effective government in France is difficult at best, de Gaulle quickly discovered, because there was a

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<sup>21</sup>John T. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in France (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), p. 85.

<sup>22</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Weakness in French Foreign Policy-Making (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 13-14.

<sup>23</sup>Marcus, op. cit., p. 87.

France.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, however, the 1947-48 "Union pour le Rénouveau" dedicated to restoring the Republic's honor and the "Union pour le Rénouveau" which is today a political program, its members believed that only such a party, under strong executive leadership (the Gaullist) could win the French vote to secure the national power of France and eliminate the "separatists."<sup>52</sup> The RFR was, thus, essentially not a political party. It was the national conscience; it was France.<sup>53</sup> The Gaullist believed that the "system" of nationalism and the personal "system" of their leader would bring this group into a formidable force on the French political scene.

Calling for independence and plans for France to stand between the East and West, and while in control the Gaullist movement within his government. He found resistance in 1948 as President of the Provisional Government, and went into retirement to await the call of the French people. That effective government in France is difficult at best, to make policy, to administer, because there was a

<sup>51</sup> John F. Harvey, De Gaulle and Nationalism in France (New York: Doubleday, 1954), p. 32.

<sup>52</sup> Edgar S. Snodgrass, Jr., De Gaulle in French Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 1-10.

<sup>53</sup> Harvey, op. cit., p. 37.

deep-seated suspicion among French citizens of any move to develop executive power within the government. After de Gaulle had stepped down, a feeling of impotence soon crept across the national consciousness. "Only when France was in her lowest depths was de Gaulle truly successful . . . . Only another disaster could restore him to the active scene."<sup>24</sup> At the root of this trouble in France lies a lack of a sense of citizenship in the people and a distrust of politics and politicians. The duties of citizens, civic responsibility, and community cooperation have long been missing in France because the people are primarily individuals; only secondary are they in any sense citizens of the state at large. This then is the foundation of the French political "imobilisme" which paralyzed the many French governments through the 1950's.

From 1945 until the exclusion of the Communists from the French Cabinet in 1947, the Government majority included the Communists, Socialists, and the Catholic MRP Party which composed three-fourths of the Constituent Assembly (later the National Assembly). It was a left-wing coalition in the grand tradition of the Bloc des Gauches. After 1947, the various French governments had to look to the Socialists, MRP, and the Radical Socialists for support. This was more

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<sup>24</sup>Davey, op. cit., p. 83.







of a coalition of the Center (it drew upon left-wing elements of the Right and right-wing elements of the Left). This coalition, which was regularly attacked by both the Gaullists and the Communists, was more characteristic of the Third Republic than of the Bloc des Gauches.<sup>25</sup>

De Gaulle's view of the cold war power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union colored his attitude toward the organizations in Europe which emerged during his absence from the active French political scene. He had been against the development of these institutions and agencies on a supra-national level. The purpose of the cooperation which these institutions would establish, he felt, should not go toward the strengthening of bonds with the extra-Continental powers (i.e., the United States and Great Britain) but to establish between the two power masses a balance in which France could exercise the role of a mediator in her position as the leader of the European bloc. In de Gaulle's stated view, "Great Britain is an island; France the cape of a continent; America another world."<sup>26</sup>

#### V. POSTWAR POLICY

Having remained with the West, France, without de

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<sup>25</sup>McKay, op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>26</sup>De Gaulle, The Call to Honor, op. cit., p. 109.

of a coalition of the Center and Right, which would also  
 mean of the right and a corresponding increase of the left.  
 This coalition, which was rejected, was rejected by both the  
 British and the Americans, and was maintained by the  
 British Republic of the East and West.<sup>11</sup>  
 The British view of the world was based on the  
 fact that the United States and the British Empire were  
 allies against the world. In 1945, when the world  
 during his speech from the British House of Commons, he  
 he had been against the development of nuclear weapons  
 and opposed to a super-national state. The purpose of the  
 conference was to discuss the world and the world.  
 This would not be a world of the world of the world.  
 For the British, power is the world of the world.  
 Great Britain and the world between the two world  
 a balance in which France could never be a world of a  
 balance in the world. In the world of the world, the  
 in the world of the world, the world of the world.  
 France the world of a world, the world of the world.<sup>12</sup>

#### V. FUTURE POLICY

Having explained the world, France, which is

<sup>11</sup> "The world of the world, the world of the world."

<sup>12</sup> "The world of the world, the world of the world."

Gaulle, embarked upon a foreign policy which combined four main parts. The first was the emphasis placed upon recovering physically and psychologically from the devastation of the war through the means offered by the Marshall Plan; second, the build-up of her military security through alliances with other Western powers; third, to seek the position of leadership in promoting Western European unity; and finally, to seek the gradual admission of Western Germany into the European structure that was emerging, but on such terms and conditions that French security was not endangered.<sup>27</sup>

The French achieved security through the structure of military alliances that began to take shape in the late 1940's. The first of these was the Anglo-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1947, known as the Dunkirk Treaty, which was directed against any future German aggression. Like the British, the French realized in the late 1940's, in the face of growing communist aggressive moves, that their security and that of Western Europe demanded a strong commitment from the United States. To the request of these two European powers which met in Brussels in March, 1948, with the Benelux countries, Washington replied in a manner reminiscent of the answer given when the Marshall Plan was

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<sup>27</sup>Davey, op. cit., p. 99.



Stalin, which was a serious policy which contained four main points. The first was the necessity placed upon recovery of physical and psychological from the devastation of the war through the means offered by the Marshall Plan; second, the build-up of her military security through alliance with other Western powers; third, to seek the position of leadership in promoting Western European unity; and finally, to seek the gradual unification of Western Germany into the European Community. This was something, but on such terms and conditions that French security was not imperiled.<sup>27</sup>

The French Government strongly through the structure of military alliances that began to take shape in the late 1940's. The first of these was the Anglo-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1947, known as the Dunkirk Treaty, which was directed against any future German aggression. Like the British, the French realized in the late 1940's, in the face of growing communist aggressive power, that their security and that of Western Europe demanded a strong alliance with the United States. To the request of these two European powers which met in Brussels in March, 1948, with the British Government, Washington replied in a letter that the content of the answer given when the Marshall Plan was

<sup>27</sup>Wray, pp. 211-212, 213.



undertaken. While sympathetic toward the movement, the United States refused to be drawn into a commitment until the Europeans demonstrated that they were not only ready, but willing to throw off the lethargy which had hung over Europe like a shroud and take the first steps in their own defense by themselves. This was also a necessary element in obtaining any type of popular support and Congressional action in the United States. The Brussels Treaty (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence) which emerged in 1948, was Europe's reply. A year later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Pact was signed, firmly committing the United States and Canada to the defense of Western Europe in peacetime. Despite the fact she was clearly dependent upon the United States in the military and economic aid fields, France continued in her attempt to achieve as much freedom as was possible under the circumstances of her dependence.

During this same period, the rise of Western Germany as an economically-resurgent entity was a major cause for French urgency in leading the way toward European integration. The obvious fact of the matter began to assert itself. Germany was no longer a defeated enemy and could not be treated as such. For this radical and swift change in Western policies toward a defeated Germany, the cold war was responsible to an overwhelming extent. The increased

unpleasant. While sympathetic towards the movement, the United States refused to be drawn into a commitment until the European demonstrated that they were not only ready, but willing to follow the policy which had won over Europe like a storm and take the first steps to their own defense by themselves. There was also a necessary element in

obtaining any type of popular support and congressional action in the United States. The Brussels Treaty (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense) which emerged in 1948, was Europe's reply. A year later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Pact was signed, finally committing the United States and Canada to the defense of Western Europe in peacetime. Despite the fact that the treaty was signed, the United States in the military and economic aid fields, France continued to act alone to achieve its own objectives as was possible under the circumstances of the situation.

During this same period, the rise of Western Germany as an economically-advanced nation was a major cause for French urgency in leading the way toward European integration. The obvious lack of the Western Powers to assist itself, Germany was no longer a defeated nation and could not be treated as such. For this reason, and with the change in German policies toward a defeated Germany, the cold war was responsible for an overwhelming support. The increased

pressure of cold war tension and the threat of a communist take-over in Western Europe made the incorporation of West German forces in the anti-Soviet coalition a vital necessity for survival. American pressure in the 1950's forced France to follow our lead in restoring Germany to the status of a sovereign state and permit her to make a contribution to the defense of Western Europe. This situation confronted France with the spectre of a resurgent Germany over which she would be able to exercise little or no effective control, and which could pose a threat to her own security. The French solution to this dilemma was to link West Germany so closely to France that she would be unable to break away, to bring Germany into an integrated Europe in which France would be the "natural" leader.

By the end of 1950, however, these objectives of French policy were not reached because of a combination of external and internal factors. The invasion of Korea on top of the Prague coup of 1948, made it appear that Europe would be next in line for communist aggressive designs. Because of this danger, NATO undertook a program of integration of the military forces of the member states, and as a consequence had to demand more of France in order to make the alliance more formidable in the face of what appeared to be imminent danger. The largest and most important factor affecting French policy in the light of these developments







was the effect of the Korean War, which made the rearmament of Western Germany and her incorporation into the NATO framework, of primary importance, Germany was needed to implement the forward strategy of NATO and to fill the gaps that existed between the forces NATO could muster and those which were needed to stop any Soviet thrust into Western Europe. France was in no position to oppose United States pressure for German rearmament, but there was still much resistance to American proposals by French leaders who did not want to see Germany rearmed and in NATO with an equal voice in the Council of Western powers. She was, at this time, not absolutely sure that her own strength would be able to control a rearmed Germany since most of her forces were committed to military operations in Indo-China and Algeria. However, because France was so heavily dependent upon American aid and good will, these same French officials were unable to counter effectively United States demands on Germany's behalf. The French sought to escape from their dilemma by attacking the unpopular idea in France of German rearmament and replacing it with the more popular concept of European integration as envisioned in the plan of M. Rene Plevan, for a European Political and Defence Community. This scheme, proposed in 1950, met its fate at the hands of the Communists and Gaullists in 1954 in a miserable defeat for its supporters, and a bitter slap at unsolicited and

was the effect of the Korean War, which made the commitment of Western Germany and her incorporation into the NATO framework, of primary importance, Germany was bound to implement the forward strategy of NATO and to fill the gaps that existed between the former NATO allied nations and those which were needed to keep any Soviet thrust into Western Europe. France was in no position to oppose United States proposals for German rearmament, but there was still much resistance to American proposals by French leaders who did not want to see German rearmament and in 1950 with an equal voice in the Council of Western Europe. The war, at this time, not absolutely sure that her own strength would be able to control a rearmament Germany since most of her forces were committed to military operations in Indo-China and Algeria. However, because France was so heavily dependent upon American aid and good will, these same French officials were unable to counter effectively United States demands on Germany's behalf. The French sought to escape from this dilemma by attacking the unpopular idea in France of German rearmament and replacing it with the more popular concept of European integration as envisioned by the plan of W. Deans Elysee, for a European Political and Defense Community. This scheme, proposed in 1950, met AEC aims at the hands of the Committee and resulted in 1954 in a military defense for its supporters, and a union aim at restricted and

unpolished blundering in French politics by the United States Government. This defeat, besides discrediting the policy of integration as a whole in the public's eyes, almost brought the European movement to a halt.<sup>28</sup>

## VI. GAULLISM AND THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE

At about this same time, the political climate in France was undergoing another of its periodic changes. The Right was becoming more attracted to a form of European integration which might offer some form of guarantee against "dangerous" economic experiments at home. The Socialists, on the other hand, plus some Radicals, grew increasingly suspicious and doubtful. This was increased by the shared dissatisfaction with the cautious immobility of the conservative governments and the dissipation of French strength and wealth in the struggle in Indo-China. The Gaullists shared these feelings.

The military leaders had a strong influence upon the Gaullist and Right-wing opinion. To them, the submergence of French identity, and of the independent French army, seemed an excessive price to pay for avoiding the resurgence of a German force. For them, the machinery of EDC was also

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<sup>28</sup>Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, De Gaulle's Republic (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 18.



unofficial planning in French politics by the 1930s.  
 These matters, treated as a whole in the political system,  
 almost brought the European movement to a halt.<sup>15</sup>

# VI. GAULLESM AND THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE

At about this time, the political climate in  
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 integration which might otherwise have been a hindrance against  
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 right governments and the likelihood of French expansion  
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The military leaders had a strong influence upon the  
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 of French identity, and of the independent French army,  
 seemed an excessive price to pay for avoiding the wreckage  
 of a German factor. For them, the machinery of the war also

<sup>15</sup>Philip M. Williams and Martin Armstrong, *The Gaullist  
 Revolution* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1957),  
 p. 142.

too complex. All believed in the absence of any democratic political superstructure, but above all, the absence of British support and Anglo-American guarantees toward France in the face of a rearmed Germany made EDC just too much of a risk for French security. Four years after it was proposed, the Gaullists campaigned with the neutralists and voted with them to defeat the Plevan plan.

De Gaulle had seen in this defense organization a surrender of French sovereignty, a weakening of the French Union, and abandonment of the French army. For him, the integration of French forces was anathema, and he has since reiterated this viewpoint on numerous occasions in regard to NATO. He stated in 1954 that the EDC,

. . . would deprive France of self-determination for fifty years, that is to say forever, take her own army away from her, forbid her all access to nuclear weapons, transfer to the American Commander-in-Chief the sole right to decide how she should be defended and even whether she should be.<sup>29</sup>

The comments of de Gaulle in 1954 are not so very different from those he has formulated in his arguments against the integration of French forces within the NATO command. The reasons for the Gaullist attitude can best be explained in the nature of Gaullist nationalism and the changed attitude toward American policies which implied a significant change in values.

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<sup>29</sup>Marcus, op. cit., pp. 97-98.





The internal dynamics of Gaullism, authoritarianism and centralization, accented the centrifugal tendencies within the RPF, and it continued its decline during the period de Gaulle was absent from the French political scene, 1946-1958. The external situation caused it to collapse. The Pinay government in 1952 used its power to break the RPF, for many Gaullists found acceptance in Pinay's Right Center government, thus depriving the RPF of one of its main reasons for existence. This worked upon the rest of the Party and forced them to combine with the Communists to work against the middle--a negative coalition at best.

The RPF later organized itself into two rump parties which threatened to deprive de Gaulle's nationalism of its chief attribute in the eyes of the public ". . . purity from partisan politics."<sup>30</sup> De Gaulle disassociated himself from this group and withdrew from the RPF. "Gaullism without de Gaulle - the whole thing was preposterous."<sup>31</sup> Thus was Gaullism transformed back into a "mystique" entity - a state of mind - from a partisan movement.

The nationalist concept of an independent France was described by de Gaulle:

The mission of France, . . . consists of doing everything to prevent the two halves of the world hurling themselves to death together. . . . At the

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

The initial objective of the...  
 not...  
 within the...  
 period of...  
 1944-1945. The...  
 The...  
 1945, for many...  
 Center...  
 reasons for...  
 help and...  
 against the...-a...

The...  
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 position...  
 of mind - from a...

The...  
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same time, without ceasing to be members of the Atlantic alliance, let us organize Europe along the lines which do not prevent such easement [sic] and do not tear us apart. Above all, let us remain France, sovereign, independent and free.<sup>32</sup>

Marcus states that the concept of Gaullist nationalism excludes, by its very nature, the moves being made in the direction of supra-national federation in Western Europe. The Gaullist concept does not envision any abandonment of national sovereignty.<sup>33</sup> Their opposition to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and especially to the European Defence Community, was evidence of this hostility to the concept of supra-nationality in these organizations and their institutions.

What the RPF desired, though it is by no means clear at all times, was European unity achieved through a more gradual process which France would be able to channel into a concert or confederation of sovereign powers and in which there would be no supra-nationally imposed authority, just French leadership.

The neutralists opposed American cold war policies, and as a result came to oppose Western European integration which they considered an aspect of American-European policy. On the other hand, the nationalist Gaullists opposed European integration on the principle of supra-nationalism and

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 94.





federation and, as a consequence, came to oppose United States policy in Europe as well because of American encouragement of the European movement toward federation. Thus, the nationalists and neutralists came to agree in their common opposition to United States cold war policies. The anti-Anglo-American feeling, which had developed from de Gaulle's wartime relations with the allies, was buried in the anti-communist period, but emerged in the new anti-American period.<sup>34</sup>

From nationalism to opposition to the EDC, from opposition to the EDC to opposition to American policy in Europe and the Far East, from opposition to American policy to opposition to the United States itself, from opposition to the United States to the assertion that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were equal dangers to the peace, from the equating of these dangers to the assertion that France must act as a bridge between the two blocs, such was the long road traveled by the General and his companions.<sup>35</sup>

During the period of his absence from political life, de Gaulle busied himself writing his War Memoirs, which, in his third volume, Salvation, contains the clearest statement he has made regarding his design for France in Europe and on the international level. The basic theme of this policy has not changed in the years since its formulation and that his actions have been directed towards implementing this program. It is apparent that he intends to complete as much of this

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 105.

habitation and, as a consequence, come to oppose United States policy in Europe as well as in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, the nationalistic and racialistic case is again in force. Common opposition to United States policy was noticed. The anti-United States feeling, which has developed since the Gaul's attitude relations with the allies, was noted in the anti-United States feeling, the feeling in the anti-United States feeling.

From American as opposition to the U.S. from opposition to the U.S. as opposition to American policy in Europe and the West, from opposition to American policy in opposition to the United States itself, from opposition to the United States to the extension of the U.S. and the U.S. to the equal danger to the people from the extension of these dangers to the nation, that is, from the U.S. to the danger between the two sides, such was the long road revealed by the General and his comments.

During the period of his second term political life, de Gaulle visited himself visiting in the Republic, which, in his third volume, Salvation, describes the closest relationship he has made regarding the design for France in Europe and in the international level. The basic theme of this policy has not changed in the years since the liberation and that his actions have been directed towards implementing this program. It is suggested that he intends to complete as much of this



program as possible before he leaves the position of power in the direction of French policy which he now holds.

I intended to assure France primacy in western Europe by preventing the rise of a new Reich that might again threaten its safety; to cooperate with the East and West and, if need be, contract the necessary alliances on one side or the other without ever accepting any kind of dependence; to transform the French Union into a free association in order to avoid the as yet unspecified dangers of upheaval; to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic and strategic bloc; to establish this organization as one of the three world powers and, should it become necessary, as the arbitor between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps. Since 1940, my every word and act had been dedicated to establishing these possibilities; now that France was on her feet again, I would try to realize them.<sup>36</sup>

## VII. THE GAULLIST GOALS

The goals which de Gaulle desires France to attain in Europe and in the international world may have their origin in his sense of France's mystical leadership ability, but they would seem to stem more from his hard-headed sense of realism and practicality than any mysticism. To some of de Gaulle's critics, his motives and actions have been ascribed to his personal ambitions, resentment, and the frustration he feels toward the Anglo-American grouping. It would appear to be sheer folly, however, to attribute to a

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<sup>36</sup> Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Salvation 1944-1946, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 204-5.

figures as political leaders in the past and position of power  
in the development of present policy which we now possess

I intended to state various things in relation  
to the by-producting the idea of a new Reichstag  
might again discuss the subject of cooperation with  
the East and West and, if need be, contact the  
necessary situation on the side of the other which  
out ever according to that of Germany, to  
transform the German Reich into a new Association  
in order to avoid the at yet uncompleted changes of  
Germany, to transform the German Reich into a political  
for the East, and the purpose of this political  
economic and strategic plan to transform this  
Association as one of the future world power and  
should be become necessary, as the relation between  
the Soviet and Anglo-American Union, since 1945,  
my every word and act has been directed to explain  
likewise these possibilities, and that there was  
on that fact, I would say to explain that.

VI. THE GERMAN REICH

The party which we desire to create is to be a  
German and in the international world may have their origin  
in the sense of Germany's special leadership ability, but  
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realization of his goals toward the Anglo-American grouping. It  
would appear to be that only, however, to attribute to a

<sup>1</sup>Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, 1944-1945,  
trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957),  
pp. 204-5.

man of his stature and beliefs such factors as these exerting a major influence upon his policy formulation.

De Gaulle is first and foremost a realist, though he may be a romantic at heart. He realizes that for France to be able to enter the realm of the super-powers and compete with them as an equal in world affairs, she must be able to at least approach, if not equal, their economic and military capabilities. France by herself does not have a reservoir of strength or the great bases of power possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. She has neither the population nor the geographic extent of the two Great Powers, and her production and resources are no match alone for the United States and Russia. Therefore, France needs Europe and de Gaulle realizes it. She needs a European grouping of states which will recognize the innately superior qualities of leadership which France has to offer and be willing to accept the advantages which such leadership will bring, if the states of Europe will but follow her lead. This is the background against which de Gaulle is constructing his European policy, which in conjunction with his Atlantic policy, best seen in his actions regarding NATO, will launch his movement for French leadership in Europe, the momentum of which will be difficult to stop once underway.

A 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalist and fundamentalist, de Gaulle personally is not attracted to the European super-power idea. . . . He sees the new European





Community he is trying to shape not as the germ of a super-power but as a constellation centered on France, giving his country the weight and authority it needs to assert itself and create a third force between the U. S. and Russia.<sup>37</sup>

To implement his plans de Gaulle is depending upon Germany's desire to remain quiescent in her attempt to remove any European fears of a revival of Nazism. De Gaulle hopes to keep Germany in this role of a non-assertive power submissively following France's lead in organizing Europe. Just how long Germany will accept this position of built-in inferiority now that "Der Alte" has left the Chancellorship and under persistent American pressure remains to be seen.

De Gaulle visualizes this Europe of tomorrow, though he most certainly does not expect it to be achieved in his time, as being completely independent of Soviet or American influence. It will be strong enough to defend itself and will not have to look to the United States deterrent to prevent or to win an aggressive war directed at Western Europe. It will be able to take care of its own defenses be they nuclear or conventional. Additionally, Great Britain will still remain on the outside just as long as she continues to favor her relationship with the U. S. over the acceptance of French leadership in the "new" Europe.

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<sup>37</sup>Ray Alan, "Anatomy of Gaullism," The New Leader, XLVI (March 4, 1963), 12.

Commented on the saying in Japan not at the time of a  
super-power but as a small nation involved in France,  
giving the country the weight and authority it needs  
to deal with the world's other powers.

To represent our plans to Berlin as depending upon Germany's desire to exercise influence in her sphere of interest may however lead to a revival of Western. Of Berlin hopes to keep Germany in this role of a non-aggressive power exclusively following France's lead in organizing Europe. That how long Germany will accept this position at all is uncertainly now that "Don Alder" has left the Chancellorship and under President Weizsäcker's tenure remains to be seen. As Berlin maintains this image of Germany, though we were certainly more not aware it to be achieved in his time, as being completely independent of Soviet or American influence. It will be many years to build itself up will not have to look to the United States Government to get sent on its way and survive and prosper in Western Europe. It will be able to take care of its own defense by itself without an international ally. Additionally, Great Britain will still remain on the outside just as long as she continues to treat her relationship with the U.S. over the Atlantic as

London, December 10, 1946.



From this "constellation" of sovereign states which will be in effect directed from Paris, the principal producers of hard goods, France and Germany, will wear down the iron curtain of Eastern Europe by supplying the "guttled Eastern markets." This, in turn, will produce a more comfortable and stable group of states within the Soviet satellite orbit and will bring about an era of peaceful co-existence from the Atlantic to the Urals.<sup>38</sup>

The concept of the "third force" in Western Europe, and the "neutralist" policy which the French attempted to pursue in 1944-1946, are clearly linked. During the period when de Gaulle was out of public office, 1946-1958, Great Britain remained aloof from the Continental Europeans while enjoying to the fullest her close tie with the United States. This caused the security-minded French to reorient their policy from a Franco-British bloc or alliance toward a Franco-German rapprochement. Thus, the "third force" as it will emerge in the "new" Europe will be Franco-German centered.

The concept of France in a federated Europe which will develop along the lines it has in the past holds no appeal for de Gaulle. He does not want a United States of

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<sup>38</sup>George W. Herald, "Charles De Gaulle's Abstractions," The New Leader, XLVI (February 18, 1963), 14.

...and this "concentration" of resources... which  
 will be in effect directed from early, the original pro-  
 ducts of hard goods, services and currency, will mean that the  
 from certain of these... by supplying the "gated"  
 "gated" market. This, in turn, will create a more com-  
 fortable and wider range of choice within the Soviet Union  
 than will be known in any of the other co-  
 existence with the Atlantic in the world.<sup>10</sup>  
 The concept of the "third force" in Western Europe,  
 and the "neutralized" policy which the French advocated in  
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 operation.  
 The concept of France in a reformed Europe will  
 still remain since the time it has in the past held as  
 respect for the world, or have not want a United States of

<sup>10</sup>George W. Bush, "The Soviet Union as a superpower,"  
 The New Yorker, 1971 (February 10, 1971), 16.

Europe even if it is led by France, for in this concept there would have to be some abrogation of French sovereignty and freedom of choice and decision which goes against de Gaulle's plans.

It is to be expected that de Gaulle will take whatever action he must to exploit every single opportunity and possibility of increasing French power and prestige in Europe, and as a world force to be met and dealt with as an equal by the states now controlling the world's destiny.





## CHAPTER II

### DE GAULLE'S RETURN TO POWER, 1958

General de Gaulle, during his period of political retirement, was critical of both the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Pact, because he believed them to be too vague to be of lasting value to France, and because as a devout nationalist, he felt they "represented the subordination of France to American dictates."<sup>1</sup> While the structure and organization of NATO has met with his criticism, the principle underlying the Pact has not.<sup>2</sup> He has been agreeable to the proposition that France needed and should have military power and equipment consistent with the prestige of a great nation. It was for this reason that his RPF Party agreed to support French rearmament as requested by the NATO Council.

Upon his return to the political scene in June, 1958, and his subsequent investiture as President of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle revealed himself clearest in his actions and attitudes toward the East-West confrontation and NATO.

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<sup>1</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France: Keystone of Western Defense (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>Herbert Luethy and David Rodnick, French Motivations in the Suez Crisis (Princeton: The Institute for International Social Research, 1956), p. 54.

## CHAPTER II

DE GAULLE'S RETURN TO POWER, 1958

General de Gaulle, during his period of political retirement, was critical of both the National Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Pact, because he believed them to be too vague to be of lasting value to France, and because he was devoutly nationalist. He felt that "represented the subordination of France to American interests." While the structure and organization of NATO has not won his criticism, the principle underlying the pact has not. "It has been applied to the proposition that French needs and should have military power and equipment consistent with the principle of a great nation. It was for this reason that the RPT Party agreed to support French participation as requested by the NATO Council."

Upon his return to the political scene in June, 1958, and his subsequent victory in the election of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle renewed himself closest to his nation and attitudes toward the East-West confrontation and NATO.

<sup>1</sup>Robert A. Feltz, *de Gaulle: The Man and the Statesman* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Robert A. Feltz, *de Gaulle: The Man and the Statesman* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 34.



He risked no major changes initially, but he was determined to re-establish France's right to be consulted as an equal and to "assert every French prerogative to the full."<sup>3</sup> It was no coincidence that Paris became more and more the center of international meetings and the headquarters of NATO.

In regard to the North Atlantic alliance he stated that he did not intend to dismantle it, but on the contrary he declared emphatically:

We do not contemplate a change in our NATO policy. We regard NATO as necessary and France will not leave the alliance. But we will cease practicing our membership in the same way we practiced it in the past. There are other ways. Only if there is no comprehension of our viewpoint would we be forced to take back our liberty of action.<sup>4</sup>

On this point, he speaks in a manner reminiscent of that speech made in Algiers in 1944 to the Consultative Assembly in which he stated that it was "the government's policy to make itself heard and understood."<sup>5</sup> This he has been trying to do for years with his allies, without much apparent success. Now he was trying again.

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<sup>3</sup>Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, De Gaulle's Republic (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 176.

<sup>4</sup>C. L. Sulzberger, The Test, De Gaulle and Algeria (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p. 116.

<sup>5</sup>Charles de Gaulle, Two Speeches by General Charles de Gaulle (New York: France Forever, 1944), p. 17.

as listed no major changes initially, but as was determined  
to re-establish France's right to be consulted as an equal  
and to "assess every French contribution to the Alliance." It  
was an indication that France would not be a  
center of international meetings and the headquarters of  
NATO.

In regard to the North Atlantic Alliance we stated  
that we did not intend to discuss it, but on the contrary  
we included ourselves:

We do not contemplate a change in our NATO policy.  
We regard NATO as necessary and France will not leave  
the Alliance. But we will make decisions on our  
policy in the same way we mentioned it in the past.  
There are other ways, why is there no compromise  
and of our viewpoint would we be known to take back  
our liberty of action.

On this point, he speaks in a manner reminiscent of  
that speech made in August 1944 to the Constitutive  
Assembly in which he stated that it was "the government's  
policy to make these issues non-negotiable." This he has  
been trying to do ever since with his allies, without much  
apparent success. Now he was trying again.

<sup>2</sup>Philip W. Williams and Walter Harrison, the Atlantic  
Atlantic (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1967),  
p. 178.

<sup>3</sup>C. W. Hollister, The Test, the Trial, and the Alliance  
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1967), p. 116.

<sup>4</sup>Charles de Gaulle, My Country, My Country (London: Collins,  
1967), p. 17.

Over the years, de Gaulle has continually repeated his desire to maintain the alliance. His latest such proclamation came at his press conference of July 29, 1963, following the signing of a partial nuclear test ban between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. He stressed the fundamental factors of French-American relations which are friendship and the alliance. Noting that friendship between the two countries is now almost two hundred years old, de Gaulle said that "such a moral capital cannot be diminished."<sup>6</sup> Regarding the alliance, de Gaulle stated:

. . . it is a fact that it now exists and that the two countries have every reason to maintain it.

Indeed, as long as the free world is faced with the Soviet bloc, . . . the peoples on both sides of the ocean, if they wish to defend themselves, must be linked together.

The Atlantic Alliance is therefore an elementary necessity.<sup>7</sup>

De Gaulle's insistence upon claiming an equal place for France in the alliance with Great Britain and the United States has been his most consistent critique of the relationships that exist within NATO. He believes that NATO makes France a dependent nation deprived of her freedom of action. In line with this, he firmly believes that the United States

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<sup>6</sup>Press Conference of President de Gaulle in The New York Times, July 30, 1963.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.





and Great Britain, not forced initially into such a subservient role, would deploy their forces in their own national interests, even though such action might entangle the other NATO partners against their wishes in areas outside their concern and NATO's. Such was the case with Cuban confrontation in 1962, when the United States forced the Soviet Union to back down. In European circles, it was believed that the confrontation could have easily resulted in bringing destruction upon the countries of Western Europe over a problem and question that did not directly involve them, and was far removed from the NATO orbit. The political consultation within the alliance seemed to be undertaken in an ex post facto manner, much to the dismay not only of General de Gaulle, but of the other members of the alliance, especially Great Britain and Germany. It seemed further proof that not much has been accomplished in bettering the problem of political consultation in NATO since the severe break in 1956.

France has always laid claim to a "special role" in NATO because of her position, geographically, within Europe which fact made her participation in NATO an absolute necessity. Without France there just could be no defense of Western Europe. She is the pivotal point in Europe. She sits across NATO supply lines to forces in Germany; NATO headquarters is in Paris; she is the main supply center for

and Great Britain, not having initially been such a member-  
 ship role, would decide their future in their own national  
 interests, even though such action might entangle the other  
 NATO partners against their wishes in areas outside their  
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 confrontation could have easily resulted in bringing Western  
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 also occupies NATO's supply lines to forces in Germany; NATO  
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the alliance, and she alone is within the periphery of the circles embracing the many organizations in the military, economic and social sphere of the "new" Europe. She is the heart of the alliance. "France recognizes its central position and has used it to extract the maximum of military aid and diplomatic recognition at the least possible sacrifice to its own national interests."<sup>8</sup>

De Gaulle knows France is needed to maintain the alliance, and he has used this as grounds to base his argument for equality in NATO policy direction.

As 1959 wore on, it was evident to foreign observers that the intransigence, which was de Gaulle's special stock in trade, was not dead but had only lain quiescent while he was inactive politically. His return to power signaled a new series of moves to gain for France the recognition she needed before attaining the greatness that was deemed her right. In pursuit of his goals, de Gaulle set about trying to improve France's relative position with the NATO alliance.

## I. THE NATO PROPOSALS

On October 25, 1958, President Charles de Gaulle

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<sup>8</sup>Eileen R. Donovan, et al., "The Future of NATO: An Outline of Probable Strengths and Weaknesses Over the Next Ten Years," Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State (Washington: Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, 1960), p. 22. (Mimeographed.)

to the two national laboratories.

On 10/10/1964, the following information was received from the  
Miami Office, dated 10/10/64, regarding the above mentioned  
subject:

to become France's collective position with the NATO alliance right. In contrast to the media, de Gaulle was about trying united states accepted the position that was deemed not now exists or never to gain the French the recognition and was inactive politically. The reason for power aligned in in France, was not that but only that position, while he and the leadership, when was de Gaulle's special speech in 1955 when he was visited by French president

addressed personal letters to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister MacMillan, and an aide-mémoire to other NATO members, in which he gave each of these leaders in the alliance his concept of France's proper role in NATO. While the exact content of the letters was not made known to the public, enough was "leaked" to enable all to know that de Gaulle proposed modifications in the alliance along three specific lines.

That deGaulle should find it possible to come out openly against the influence of the United States in NATO was a sign that he not only felt it was essential that he should make his stand against the atom-carrying bombers flying from French bases, but that he believed that France was fully strong enough to make herself heard and understood despite the opposition of America and Britain.<sup>9</sup>

First, he protested that, while NATO was composed of fifteen sovereign nations, the really important decisions were taken by either the United States alone, or in concert with Great Britain, in what had been termed the "Anglo-American Partnership." He, therefore, urged that this dual relationship be expanded to include France in a triumvirate. This proposal came about mainly because of the decision of the United States and Great Britain to take concerted action

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<sup>9</sup>Stanley F. Clark, The Man Who is France: The Story of General Charles DeGaulle (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963), p. 233.





in Jordan and Lebanon without first consulting him.<sup>10</sup> He further believed that the trouble in these countries, Jordan and Lebanon, stemmed directly from the abortive action conducted by the Anglo-French forces in Suez in 1956. The intercession of the United States in this joint Anglo-French operation, in opposition to the move by its "partners" in Egypt, not only precipitated the later crisis, de Gaulle believed, but made the British rush to restore the exclusive relationship with the United States. This led to a shift in the balance within NATO so that by 1958 the United States and Great Britain had drawn closer together and France was on the outside looking in.

On the second point, de Gaulle urged that the three-power directorate not restrict itself to just the area covered by the NATO Treaty, but that it be extended to cover the areas where Soviet advances were being made or were threatening to encircle and isolate the West. The United States and the United Kingdom were working to meet these threats, but the specific French objection lay in the fact that they were doing so without permitting her to be a party to the decisions. De Gaulle believes that NATO's future lies outside the present limits of its Treaty responsibilities,

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<sup>10</sup> Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France, Troubled Ally, DeGaulle's Heritage and Prospects (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 464.

in London and London without their consulting him.<sup>10</sup> He further believed that the British in these countries, Jordan and Lebanon, seemed always from the British action con-

ducted by the Anglo-French forces in 1914. The international of the United States in this Anglo-French operation, in operation to the move of its "partners" in

Europe and only recognized the latter crisis, the British believed, had made the British try to reverse the exclusive relationship with the United States. This led to a crisis in

the balance which was set by 1920 the United States and Great Britain had grown closer together and France was on the outside looking in.

On the second crisis, the British agreed that the three-power alliance had reached itself as just the same covered by the 1910 Treaty, but that it be extended to cover

the years when British interests were being made at risk threatening to weaken and London the West. The United States and the United Kingdom were working to meet these

crises, but the specific French objection lay in the fact that they were doing so without consulting her to be a party to the decision. The British believed that this return

lies outside the present limits of its treaty responsibilities.

<sup>10</sup> Charles G. Powell, Dr. Powell, General A. G. Powell's Letters and Documents 1890-1901 (London: A. Hodges, 1900), p. 142.



and, therefore, should be extended to include Africa where France had commitments to defend her former colonies.<sup>11</sup> France's attitude on national defense continually emphasizes the point that her strategic responsibilities extend from Dunkirk to Brazzaville. De Gaulle's objective in making this point was to gain a larger voice in the overall policy planning of the Western powers in the non-NATO areas. He had based this upon France's global responsibilities. The global nature of these "responsibilities" in 1958 and later consisted of France's commitments to her former colonies, some of which remained in the new French Community. France also had commitments to those new states which had concluded cooperative agreements with France, but which did not choose to associate themselves in the Community. The problem with this is that the position upon which France bases her argument for an equal voice outside the NATO area rests upon these African commitments, and they are "built upon sand."<sup>12</sup> For example, two new states, Mali and Togo, refused to sign political agreements with France. Others have refused to enter into common defense arrangements, preferring more freedom of action. In many of the remaining African states,

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 465.

<sup>12</sup>Geoffrey Warner, "President DeGaulle's Foreign Policy," World Today, 18 (August, 1962), 325.



there has been considerable pressure upon the governments to take a more "African" line rather than to continue to pursue a "French" policy.

The second proposal by de Gaulle has been modified slightly according to M. Peyrefitte, the French Minister of Information. In a speech on Canadian television in June, 1962, he outlined the current French concept.

In the absence of an extension of the geographical area of the pact, France proposes that, outside N.A.T.O. and for world problems which N.A.T.O. cannot resolve, the three western powers which have global responsibilities shall cooperate closely. There is no question of a three-power directorate within N.A.T.O., but of a close co-operation of the Big Three outside N.A.T.O. in order to fill N.A.T.O. gaps.<sup>13</sup>

In the third proposal, de Gaulle stated that France had been denied her share of important positions within the command structure of NATO. SHAPE was assuming all the proportions of an American military staff. The command structure, de Gaulle emphasizes, "exhibits the careful concern for autonomy of the United Kingdom and the United States."<sup>14</sup> SACEUR, in de Gaulle's opinion, is not truly representative of the country that would be most affected in the event of future aggression in Western Europe.

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 324.

<sup>14</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "DeGaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," International Organization, XV (Summer, 1961), 351.





De Gaulle feels that the relatively withdrawn positions of the United States and Great Britain might lead them to develop a more attenuated sense of commitment to European defense than France. The "potential disparity in involvement had accentuated the desperate allocation of military responsibility within the alliance."<sup>15</sup> Further, the largest proportion of United States and British troops are not committed to NATO. They are scattered throughout the world fulfilling commitments outside the NATO alliance system which could have serious repercussions upon the non-committed and usually non-consulted NATO partners.

To de Gaulle, the integration of French troops into NATO is nothing more than a fragmentation of that portion of French power. In this regard, he argues that in the NATO defense structure, France and Germany are designated to furnish the majority of land forces while the United States and the United Kingdom support the alliance with air power, missiles, and ships. De Gaulle was quick to point out that these operating principles within NATO reflect the inferior position given France. This organization for the defense of an area which is so vital to France should not be dominated by two nations for whom Western Europe might not be as indispensable at some future time and under different

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 350.

of which would be the responsibility of the United States and Great Britain should lead them to develop a more advanced sense of responsibility in the future. The potential difficulty in involving them has been recognized and the Department of Defense is studying the possibility of military responsibility within the alliance.<sup>12</sup> Further, the Japanese proportion of United States and British troops are not committed to NATO. They are scattered throughout the world fulfilling commitments outside the NATO alliance system which could have serious repercussions upon the non-committed and possibly non-committed NATO members.

As to Germany, the disposition of French troops there NATO is working more than a fragmentation of that position of French power. In this regard, an agreement that in the NATO defense structure, France and Germany are designated to furnish the majority of land forces while the United States and the United Kingdom support the alliance with air power, missiles, and ships. The details was given to point out that these operating principles within NATO reflect the position given France. This organization for the defense of an area which is so vital to France should not be dominated by two nations for whom German forces might not be as indispensable as some French and British officials



circumstances.<sup>16</sup> Such a concept the United States has been trying to dispel for some time, generally not meeting with much success in convincing most Europeans, especially de Gaulle.

As a realist, de Gaulle appreciates his rather tenuous bargaining position. This is one of the main reasons for his concentration upon building a united Europe around French leadership, "as a kind of insurance policy" to enable France to continue to talk to the Anglo-American's on an equal footing.<sup>17</sup> French leadership in Europe is accepted, by the French at least, as inevitable because of the almost submissive role Germany has accepted in Europe and because Western Germany has to a great extent been neutralized by the Paris-Bonn Axis and the close relationship between de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer.

## II. ANTI-INTEGRATION POLICY AND NATO

The points which de Gaulle placed before America and Great Britain, in his letter, were aired at the December, 1958, meeting of the NATO Council, at which time it was clear that unless the structure of the NATO organization were modified to meet some of France's objections, NATO would get little from France in the future.

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 351.

<sup>17</sup>Warner, op. cit., p. 325.

circumstances.<sup>16</sup> Thus, a country like the United States was seen  
 tending to depend on some time, generally not needed with  
 much success in connection with European, especially the

French.

As a result, the French government has been forced  
 out regarding position. This is not the main reason for  
 his conclusion upon finding a single source around French  
 leadership, "as a kind of permanent policy" to enable France  
 to continue to play in the Anglo-American's on an equal  
 footing.<sup>17</sup> French leadership in Europe is needed, by the  
 French at least, as a permanent source of the almost un-  
 der-estimated Germany was accepted in Europe and because without  
 Germany was to a great extent seen maintained by the rela-  
 tion Asia and the close relationship between the French and  
 Chancellor Adenauer.

## II. THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND NATO

The policy which the French played before America was  
 great success. In the last, very much at the moment,  
 1955, meeting of the NATO Council, at which time it was  
 clear that major the structure of the NATO organization  
 was modified to meet some of France's objectives, NATO  
 would see little more France in the future.

<sup>16</sup> Le Monde, 20 Jan. 1955, p. 152.  
<sup>17</sup> Le Monde, 20 Jan. 1955, p. 152.

Failing to get the concessions sought, de Gaulle, early in 1959, embarked upon a policy toward NATO in which France withdrew the French Fleet from operational control of NATO's Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, withdrew her strategic Fighter Air Force from the unified air defense system for Western Europe, refused to allow stockpiling of nuclear weapons upon her soil, and refused to permit the installation of IRBM sites in France. By these measures, which were not wholly tactical in nature, de Gaulle hoped to pressure the United States into accepting his proposals. At the same time, they gave a clearer indication of his attitude toward the alliance, which, in his opinion, should be based upon the principle of coalition rather than of integration.

DeGaulle is at heart, . . . innately suspicious of the NATO concept of an interdependent and integrated military structure. He appears to feel that the security and national interests of France are best protected by a return to the original NATO concept of an alliance of independent national states and national forces.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, when NATO placed the missiles, which de Gaulle refused, in Turkey and Italy, he was not rebuffed in the slightest. This coincided exactly with his preferences for independence.<sup>19</sup>

At his first press conference, March 25, 1959, after

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<sup>18</sup>Donovan, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>19</sup>Williams and Harrison, op. cit., p. 177.



...valuing to you the conversation tonight, to tonight,  
 early in 1952, indicated upon a fairly general basis in which  
 Vietnam exhibited the typical Asian type of emotional content, the  
 NATO's Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southwest Asia,  
 then the strategic light in which the United States  
 believed upon the Western Europe, viewed as after 1950-  
 1951 in which respect there was only one element in  
 which the inspection of NATO was in place. It was  
 however, which was not really tactical in nature, as  
 Gault tried to present the United States into accepting  
 the program, for the very first time, after a clear indi-  
 cation of his attitude toward the alliance, which, in the  
 opinion, would be based upon the principle of coalition  
 rather than on integration.

...in which is at heart, ... immediately recognition of  
 the NATO concept of an independent and integrated  
 military structure. He suggests to that the NATO  
 ally and military interests of NATO are not  
 recognized by a return to the original NATO concept of  
 an alliance of independent national states and  
 national interests.  
 Then, when NATO gives the alliance, which he seems to want,  
 in NATO and unity, he was not ignored in the alliance.  
 The collection exactly with his presentation for integration.  
 At the time of his presentation, March 15, 1952, 1952.

15 (continued) pp. 212-213, p. 214.

16 (continued) pp. 214-215, p. 217.

assuming the Presidency of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle attempted to clarify his position in regard to the alliance.

One might think, . . . that France might consider keeping out of the quarrel. Being without means of action, that is to say of destruction, equal to those in the hands of the Americans and the Russians, and thus of power to try and impose her policy, she might try to keep outside the conflict and in the last resort of war. This would amount to France's giving up her reasons for living in an attempt to keep her life.

But also this would be to destroy the Atlantic Alliance, which is unimaginable without the participation of France.

We prefer to maintain the Alliance until the day when peace sees its future assured.<sup>20</sup>

He states, however, that he believed the alliance would be,

. . . more alive and stronger the more the great states which are part of it unite on the basis of a cooperation where each pays his way rather than on that of integration where the states and peoples and governments see themselves, within the sacred domain of their own defense, deprived more or less of their role and responsibilities.<sup>21</sup>

M. Louis Joxe, a member of the Debré Cabinet, in a speech on October 20, 1959, pointed out that while France contributed land forces to the shield of NATO, there was not given to her in the system an adequate measure of responsibility for making decisions of strategy that would affect

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<sup>20</sup> De Gaulle's News Conference, The New York Times, March 26, 1959.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

attempting the elimination of the latter category, as usually  
 attempted to clarify the position in regard to the situation.

One might think, however, that a clear answer might consist  
 keeping out of the picture. Being without means of  
 action, there is no way of destruction, equal to those  
 in the hands of the individual and the Russian, and  
 those of power on any and foreign war policy, who might  
 try to keep within the limits and in the last  
 resort of war. This would amount to leaving the  
 war without for itself, in an attempt to keep the war

and also that there be no strategy the Russian  
 Alliance, which is considered without the Russian  
 position of French.

We must be prepared to follow until the day  
 when peace comes the future situation.

We must, however, take no account of the situation.

which is

... more than one strategy the more the more  
 states which are part of it will be in the hands of a  
 cooperation which will give the way toward them on  
 that of information about the world and people and  
 governments and movements, within the world domain  
 of which are the world, the world and the world of their  
 role and responsibility.

It must be clear, however, that the world is a

system on October 10, 1939, which was the first time

contributed toward peace in the world of 1939, which was not

given to us in the system in which we lived at present.

Finally for making mention of strategy must mean allow

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 the world's war conditions, the first time.

March 14, 1939.

11  
 1939.



these French forces. But beyond this, Joxe stated, "France considers that the integration of forces has disadvantages of a moral nature."<sup>22</sup> This is a point which de Gaulle had continually stressed and which on November 3, 1959, he made quite clear in its meaning.

A country like France can make war only if it is her own war. The effort must be her own effort. If such were not the case, if we allowed the defense of France to be entrusted over the long period to non-national agencies or to be fused or confused with something else, it would no longer be possible for us to maintain the idea of the State. As for our military command . . . if this were only one element in a hierarchy which did not belong to us, its authority would rapidly disappear. The system known as "integration," which was introduced and even put into practice to some extent after we had undergone great trials, and when we had not yet recovered our national entity, and at a time when it was thought that the free world was confronted by an unbound danger; such systems of integration have had their day.<sup>23</sup>

While de Gaulle believes that France needs allies and that, in certain circumstances, she must coordinate the defense of France with these allies, it does not alter his anti-integration attitude. He believes that integration would be an abdication of France's rights as a Great Power--she must claim her place among the great powers by virtue of the respect which is due her because of her past history.

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<sup>22</sup>Roger Massip, "DeGaulle, Europe and NATO," Western World, III (February, 1960), 14.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

these French forces, but report that they were taken prisoner  
 somewhere near the intersection of French and American  
 of a small party.<sup>12</sup> This is a point which is made in  
 occasionally repeated and which on September 1, 1957, in  
 quite clear in its meaning.

A country like France can make use only if it is  
 not too far. The effort must be not too great. If  
 were not too far, it is almost the same as  
 France to be situated over the long period of time  
 national expansion or to be placed in contact with  
 existing ones. It would be better to be placed for us  
 to maintain the line of the border. As far as this  
 any country, it is still only one country in a  
 history which did not seem to be the outcome  
 would really disappear. The system known as "in-  
 tegration," which was introduced and even now is  
 practice in some areas, is not a European great  
 crisis, and when we had not the knowledge and national  
 unity, and at a time when it was thought that the  
 two world was controlled by an external force, and  
 system of integration was and still is.

With the belief that France must make and  
 that, in certain circumstances, we must consider the  
 balance of French with other states, it does not mean the  
 anti-integrationist. The belief that integration  
 would be an addition to French's power is a great force—  
 and would give the French more the same power by virtue of  
 the report which is the best evidence of the past history.

<sup>12</sup> "The French, the British, the Americans, the French and the British,"  
 "The French, the British, the Americans, the French and the British,"  
 "The French, the British, the Americans, the French and the British,"

### CHAPTER III

#### DE GAULLE'S EUROPE DES PATRIES AND HIS ATLANTIC POLICY

The Europe of de Gaulle is not the Europe which the true "Europeans," M. Jean Monnet, M. Robert Schuman, and M. Maurice Faure, hope will emerge as a future federalist entity. The Gaullist vision of Europe differs from that of the "Europeans" in purpose as well as in method. The Gaullists desire to break away from American tutelage and dominance, which is expressed in the NATO organization, while the "Europeans" think more about expanding existing Atlantic integration (NATO) into a closer partnership in terms of a North Atlantic Community. De Gaulle's views of a Confederation of European sovereign states were spelled out in his press conference statements of September 5, 1960.<sup>1</sup>

To build Europe, that is to say, to unite it, is evidently something essential. It is trite to ask why this great centre of civilisation, of strength, of reason, of prosperity, is being smothered by its own ashes. What is necessary, to build Europe, is to proceed, not by following our dreams, but according to realities.

Now what are the realities of Europe? What are the pillars on which it can be built? . . . States are the only entities that have the right to make decrees and

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<sup>1</sup>France and the European Community, Occasional Paper No. 11 (London: Political and Economic Planning, 1961), pp. 9-10.





the authority to act. To imagine that we can create effective means of action, supported by the peoples, above and beyond the member states is nothing but an illusion.<sup>2</sup>

If this is an accurate reflection of de Gaulle's views on uniting Europe, where does this place the organizations and institutions which France not only promoted but to which she had committed herself before the return of de Gaulle in 1958?

De Gaulle has been placed in the position of having to accept what has gone before. He has accepted the EEC and the institutions of the Communities partly because they were obligations which had to be met under existing treaty provisions. His formal acquiescence came on December 28, 1958, when he decided that France should be permitted to participate in the Common Market on an equal basis with the other members of the Community.<sup>3</sup> He felt that, in addition to the obligations under the Rome Treaty, the long-range nature of the EEC and its lack of federative aspects would not make France's participation seem a surrender of his principles of confederation. While accepting the Communities and their institutions (partially out of fear, too, of alienating the other members if his opposition were too strong), he

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France Under De Gaulle (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1960), p. 47.

the majority of the. It is possible that we can make  
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undertook a policy of attempted reform in the existing institutions and the channelization of future Community developments, especially along the lines of political cooperation, in the direction of confederation.

Regarding the institutional framework of the European Economic Community, de Gaulle, in his conference with the press on September 5, 1960, said:

As long as nothing serious happens, they function fairly well without too much trouble, but as soon as something dramatic happens and a serious problem has to be settled, it can be seen that no High Authority has political authority; it is only the states which have it.<sup>4</sup>

The same thought was expressed by M. Michael Debré at Metz on October 2, 1960.

European Unity cannot be created solely through institutions.

In Europe, legitimate power is the power which comes from national sovereignty and against this power arbitrary outside tyranny's like the so-called "supra-national" institutions can do nothing.<sup>5</sup>

#### I. L'EUROPE DES PATRIES

In July, 1959, a little more than a year after taking office, President de Gaulle presented a plan to the other members of the EEC, which would modify the Community and its

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<sup>4</sup>France and the European Community, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

understand a better way of working with the existing in-  
stitutions and the communication of future community devel-  
opments, especially along the lines of political cooperation,  
in the direction of consideration.

Regarding the institutional framework of the European  
Community, the Council, in its consideration with the  
press on September 11, 1960, said:

As long as existing national systems, their function  
being well defined for some time, but as soon as  
something different happens and a serious problem has  
to be solved, it can be seen that the high authority  
has political responsibility in only the areas which  
have been

The same thought was expressed by Mr. Schuman during the  
press on October 11, 1960.

European unity cannot be created solely through  
legislation.

In Europe, legislative power is the power which  
must have national sovereignty and without this  
power arbitrary executive tyranny is like the so-  
called "ghost-parliament" institution on the  
continent.

#### 7. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE

In July, 1959, a little more than a year after taking  
office, President de Gaulle presented a plan to the press  
members of the SAC, which would unify the Community and its

<sup>1</sup> Fraser and the European Community, pp. 111, 112, 113.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 112.

institutions into a confederal organization and also restrict future political developments within the Community to a confederation of sovereign yet separate members. This was the beginning of the de Gaulle plan for L'Europe des Patries.

The plan for confederation had five main features which were outlined by M. Alain Peyrefitte in Le Monde in a series of articles on "The Future of Europe."<sup>6</sup>

The first feature of the new system was that all political initiative would remain with the respective governments. Member states would then not have to risk becoming involved in any matter which might threaten their own interests. In the Confederation, there would be no fear of an assembly gaining a dominating position for each government would keep the control of all political matters in their own hands.<sup>7</sup>

The second important point in the de Gaulle plan is that European policy would be formulated at the "summit" by the Heads of Government. Coordination and the implementation

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<sup>6</sup>In the light of later developments on the Fouchet Committee, these articles which appeared in Le Monde on September 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1960, presented a clear and incisive outline of just what de Gaulle wants. While outside official government circles at the time these articles appeared, M. Peyrefitte nevertheless reflected quite accurately the government's position which was later revealed in the Fouchet Committee discussions and the meetings of the Heads of State.

<sup>7</sup>France and the European Community, op. cit., p. 32.



institutions must be encouraged to participate and also to  
 assist in the political development which the Community as  
 a whole is working to achieve. This was  
 the beginning of the so-called plan for European development.  
 The plan for development was then put forward.

which was outlined by the European Development Fund in a  
 series of articles in the Journal of Development.

The first feature of the new system was that all  
 political institutions would work with the respective govern-  
 ments. Second, there would also be a high degree of  
 involvement in the system which would ensure that the  
 system, in the Community, would be in line with  
 the principles of a democratic system and the government  
 would have the support of all political parties in their own  
 hands.<sup>7</sup>

The second important point in the so-called plan is  
 that European policy would be determined by the "Committee" in  
 the House of Government. This would be the institution

<sup>7</sup> In the light of the developments on the Treaty  
 Committee, some articles which appeared in the Journal of  
 September 19, 19, and 20, 1960, contained a list of  
 legislative articles of law which would be put forward  
 and which would be put forward to the House of Government  
 and the House of Government would be put forward to the  
 House of Government. It is important to note that the  
 Committee for the House of Government was put forward  
 in the House of Government and the House of Government  
 would be put forward.

<sup>8</sup> Journal of the House of Government, pp. 12-13.

of such policy would be the work of national authorities acting directly. "At the highest level, problems which have occupied the technocrats for weeks can often be solved at a single session when they are treated as political problems."<sup>8</sup>

The third feature of the Confederal structure would lie in the priority given to the coordination of foreign and defense policies. Political union, M. Peyrefitte points out, would be able to protect such interests a country might have which it would be unable to safeguard as a single State. At the same time, the Confederal principle would leave the State free to act as its own interests dictate.

De Gaulle's favorite political stratagem, that of a direct appeal to the people in the form of referendums, is the fourth feature. Such appeals would be an essential part of a Confederated Europe, until such time as it was determined that progress was sufficiently far advanced as to permit direct elections to the European Parliament. In this feature, de Gaulle stresses that the voice of the people will be heard and will play an active part in the building of the "new" Europe.

As with all the organizations which have appeared in the "new" Europe, the de Gaulle plan has a transition period to bring the adoption of the scheme in with as little

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

to much policy would be the work of national authorities acting directly. At the highest level, problems which have occupied the leadership for weeks and often as long as a single session when they are treated as political problems. The third feature of the Conference structure would be the priority given to the coordination of foreign and national policies. Political Union, as a specific policy, would be able to produce some interest in a country right away which it would be unable to elicit as a single State. At the same time, the Conference principles would leave the State free to act on its own interests directly. The Committee's former political newspaper, that of a direct appeal to the people in the form of statements, is the fourth feature. Such appeals would be an essential part of a Confederated Europe, until such time as it was determined that progress was sufficiently far advanced as to permit direct elections to the European Parliament. In this feature, the Committee stresses that the voice of the people will be heard and will play an active part in the building of the new Europe.

As with all the organizations which have appeared in the "new" Europe, the Committee has a transition period in which the adoption of the scheme is with a view



difficulty as possible. This feature of progressiveness has the transition period divided into several stages, corresponding roughly to the expected pattern of development of the political Community.

In the initial stage, the Heads of Government would meet every three months for "summit" discussions. The respective national ministers of the various departments of each government would organize themselves into working committees or groups. In all cases, at this stage, decisions would be taken unanimously.

The second stage would have the Heads of Government meeting more frequently, perhaps once a month, and there would also be a referendum for the people to express their opinions on the development of the Confederation. At this stage, decisions would be taken by a weighted and qualified majority vote.

A second referendum would be held when it was deemed appropriate and with the acceptance of the people the Confederal Pact, which until then joined the member states, would be changed into a Charter of Confederation. This then would mark the third and final, irreversible stage of the plan. At this point, all decisions would be reached by a straight majority vote, though it would be weighted.

The French official view of Europe organized under the de Gaulle plan might be described as minimalist. The



popular view, however, assumes that this Europe would be more or less a reversion to the intergovernmental approach encountered in the Council of Europe and the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation). In such an organization, the Council of Ministers would be supreme and reach their decisions by unanimous vote. Such a structure in the past has proved frustrating and in the plan for European Confederation could easily result in nothing being accomplished in the institutions set up under that system. For this reason, the French official view accepts the principle of majority voting in the second and third stages of transition. This will ensure that in these stages the Confederation will be able to get something done without being bogged down by a veto. In the first and formative stage of the transition period, however, when the most important political decisions on the future of the European Community would be expected to take place, unanimous voting will be the rule.

As mentioned previously, the decision-making process would be exclusively reserved to the representatives of the sovereign national governments. In such a procedure, each member would undoubtedly be influenced by his state's particular national interests. The outcome would most probably be compromise which in practice would mean the acceptance and acquiescence by the smaller members to the policies of the larger more powerful members - France and Germany.



...the fact that this report would be  
...of fact a reversal in the international approach  
...program in the Council of Europe and the OECD countries  
...for European Economic Cooperation). In such an agree-  
...the Council of Ministers would be agreed and each  
...their decision by unanimous vote. Such a structure in the  
...has been proved feasible and in the past for European  
...Coordination could easily result in formalized working  
...in the institutions and by mutual trust system. For  
...this reason, the system of official visits through the principle  
...of majority voting in the Council and kind of stages of devel-  
...tion. This will ensure that in these stages the Council  
...will also be able to get something done without being bogged  
...down by a veto. In the first and formative stage of the  
...formation period, however, when the most important political  
...decisions on the future of the European Community would be  
...agreed to take place, unanimous voting will be the rule.  
...As mentioned previously, the decision-making process  
...would be exclusively reserved to the representatives of the  
...sovereign national governments. In such a structure, each  
...member would automatically be influenced by his state's poli-  
...tician national interests. The national will would naturally  
...be considered which in practice would mean the dominance  
...the collection of the Council members to the politics of  
...the last and most important element - the national will.

Attainment of any measure of agreement on policy matters within the Community would be possible only by a continuing concert of interest between the larger members - a perpetuation of the understanding which is now embodied in the Paris-Bonn Axis.<sup>9</sup>

In the area of foreign policy formulation in the European Confederation, Pryce states:

The adoption of a majority-voting system without the participation in the preparatory stage of a body charged with the formulation of proposals suited to the Community's interest as a whole could also have disasterous consequences.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, in the absence of any Community executives such as the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or the Commissions of the EEC and EURATOM, it would be almost impossible to avoid a direct clash of national interests. The chances for success of such a system in relation to the decision-making process would seem to be small indeed. Additionally, there would be a very serious weakness in that such a system would be devoid of responsibility to the Community as a whole.

Concerning the Parliamentary mechanism of the Confederation, de Gaulle does not advocate any such effective organization. While he considers it desirable to have

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<sup>9</sup>Roy Pryce, The Political Future of the European Community (London: John Marshbank Limited, 1962), p. 53.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 54. [Italics added.]

...the Commission is not in a position to ...

The adoption of a majority-voting system without the participation in the preparatory stage of a body charged with the formulation of proposals suited to the Community's interest as a whole could also have disastrous consequences.

... that, in the absence of any Community executive and  
at the high authority of the European Coal and Steel Com-  
munity (ECSC) or the Commission of the EC and EURATOM, it  
would be almost impossible to build a direct union of in-  
dustrial interests. The concept of a union of such a system  
in relation to the decision-making process would seem to be  
quite incoherent. Additionally, there would be a very serious  
weakness in that such a system would be devoid of negotia-

[illegible]



popular support obtained through the referendums, this is not really a direct part of the governmental process. He envisions it more as a cheering section which stays on the political side lines. The Parliamentary body in this case is only for show. It is not expected to take any direct action in the decision-making process of the Community.

The Gaullist view of the Community's political future is, in fact, the present Fifth Republic writ large - a sobering thought for those who are inclined to view Europe des Patries as a welcome and acceptable philosophy for the future.<sup>11</sup>

The main objective of the French government and de Gaulle in proposing to establish new institutions, especially the joint political secretariat which would be responsible to the Heads of Government and the gradual evolution of a Confederation, is the development of common policies among the Six. This is an essential feature of the Gaullist goal of French leadership of a European "third force."

The Gaullists believe that the sovereignty of states is the only basis of political authority and reality. They reject completely the concept of supra-nationality. Thus, the existing institutions of the European Communities are only instruments of governmental cooperation. They cannot

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 55-56.

supplies support without having the responsibility, that is  
 not really a direct part of the political process. The  
 institution is much more a supporting structure than a part of the  
 political side itself. The responsibility must be clear  
 in only for now. It is not expected to have any direct  
 effect in the development process of the Community.

The main task of the Community's political  
 future is, in fact, the present with regard to  
 the - a number of things for those who are involved  
 in the future of the Community as a whole and its  
 development for the future.

The main objective of the French Government and the

Committee is proposed to establish new institutions, espe-  
 cially the joint political institution which would be  
 responsible for the future of the Community and the future pro-  
 vision of a constitution, in the development of common  
 policies among the six. This is an essential feature of the  
 limited goal of the Community as a European Union.

Force.

The Council agrees that the sovereignty of states  
 is the only basis of political authority and responsibility. They  
 reject completely the concept of supra-nationality. They  
 are willing to maintain the existing institutions of the Community and are  
 only interested in strengthening the existing institutions. They would

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 12/12/66

have an authority above and beyond that of national governments. While they function well in times of tranquillity, in times of crisis they will fail for they cannot overrule national interests and national institutions.<sup>12</sup>

This confederal plan for Europe came out just six months after M. Couve de Murville had effectively ended the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) negotiations with Great Britain. It did not, however, find much favor among the other five members of the EEC, particularly with the Belgian and Dutch governments. Against this initial opposition in the European Commission, the plan fell into the background of other Community matters until July, 1960.<sup>13</sup>

In July, 1960, there began a series of ministerial discussions initiated by the French in a new drive to implement de Gaulle's ideas. The first discussion took place at Rambouillet between President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer on July 29-30. These two European leaders discussed at some length the future development of political cooperation in Europe. Following this Heads of State consultation were further meetings between French ministers and the ministers of the other EEC members.

From late August through early October, 1960, there

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<sup>12</sup>France and the European Community, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>13</sup>"Reversal of Alliances," The Economist, CCVI (January 26, 1963), 294.



have an authority above and beyond that of national governments. While they function well in times of tranquillity, in times of crisis they will fail for they cannot override national interests and national institutions.<sup>12</sup>

This concluded that the Union had not yet the merits that it gave to Europe and effectively ended the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) negotiations with Great Britain. In the end, however, that such a union among the great free members of the EC, particularly with the British and West Germany. Against this initial opposition in the European Commission, the plan fell into the hands of other Community leaders until July, 1960.<sup>13</sup>

In July, 1960, there began a series of ministerial discussions initiated by the French in a new drive to begin the process of integration. The first ministerial meeting took place at Luxembourg on July 15-16. There two European leaders discussed at length the future development of political cooperation in Europe. Following this round of talks, the second round of talks was held between French ministers and the ministers of the other EC members. From late August through early October, 1960, there

<sup>12</sup> [Keesing and the European Community, pp. 224-25].

<sup>13</sup> [Keesing and the European Community, pp. 224-25].

were more French-initiated ministerial discussions in Paris and Rambouillet at which de Gaulle and his ministers expounded upon the French plan for a Confederated Europe and sounded out the other members' reactions. At the same time, the five other members of the EEC held meetings among themselves to discuss the merits of the French plan for the Community.

On February 10, 1961, a special committee on political cooperation within the Community was established in Paris under a French chairman, M. Christian Fouchet. This committee was charged with the task of considering a French draft treaty for political union, or confederation, among the member states. Many meetings were held by the committee in consideration of the French proposal, but in April, 1962, it all came to an end when the Belgian and Dutch governments refused to continue the discussions until Britain's request for membership in the Community had been acted upon. De Gaulle, it appeared, did not want Great Britain in the Community at that time, not until he had consolidated French leadership within the Six to such an extent that Great Britain would be forced to follow the French lead. This was confirmed by his statements on January 14, 1963, at his press conference.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>De Gaulle's News Conference, The New York Times, January 15, 1963.

and were immediately ministerial appointments in 1941  
and continued to work in the office and the newspaper and  
continued with the French side for a considerable time and  
continued with the above subject, eventually, at the same time,  
the first direct contact in the 1940s was made among them—  
never to discuss the matter at the French side for the  
Community.

In January 1941, a special committee on political  
and economic affairs was established and continued in  
Paris under a French Minister, M. Gabriel Lippmann. This  
committee was charged with the task of considering a French  
draft treaty, the political nature, on contemporary, among  
the member states. Such meetings were held by the committee  
in consultation with the French government, and in 1941, 1942,  
1943 and 1944, and when the subject was under government  
control in 1945, the committee was dissolved. The committee  
for membership in the Community had been asked upon 1941  
family, it appeared, and was sent back to the Com-  
mission in 1945. The committee was dissolved in 1945.  
Legislative efforts in 1945 and 1946 on several occasions  
efforts were made to follow the French side. This was  
continued by the committee on January 1941, 1942, 1943,  
1944 and 1945.

January 12, 1941  
The Committee on Political and Economic Affairs



There was also within France at this time a grave concern that with the admission of Britain into the EEC this would open the doors to Denmark and Norway and enlarge the present Six to such a size that France might not be able to exert her influence. The French knew what the Europe of the Six was like and how it functioned and could probably be made to function in the future. No one, including President de Gaulle, was certain just what a European Community of nine or more members would be like or exactly how it would function institutionally. The biggest uncertainty was, of course, the question of French control over such an expanded Community.

For a time after the protests of the Belgian and Dutch governments, de Gaulle put off his idea, until his tour of the Federal German Republic in the fall of 1962. At this time he brought up his scheme for Europe again but in the form of an association between France and West Germany.<sup>15</sup> It would be organized much in the same way as the Western European Confederation plan studied by the Fouchet committee. It had the advantage over the plan presented to the Fouchet committee in that it did not include all the members of the Six, just the two most powerful states. Thus, the smaller states would have to fall in line or be left in isolation

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<sup>15</sup>"Reversal of Alliances," op. cit., p. 295.

There was also a strong feeling at this time a group  
 thought that the situation of affairs in the EU was  
 really open and honest in Germany and Norway and other  
 groups did to reach a state that France might not be able to  
 extend the industrial. The French knew what the image of the  
 his was like and was determined and could probably be  
 made to function in the future. No one, including French  
 or British, was certain just what a European Community of  
 nine or more members would be like or exactly how it would  
 function institutionally. The biggest uncertainty was, of  
 course, the question of French control over such an organized  
 Community.

For a time after the protests in the Belgian and  
 Dutch governments, the British did not say, until the  
 end of the period between reported in the fall of 1961. At  
 this time we thought up his action was taken again but in  
 the form of an association between France and West Germany.<sup>11</sup>  
 It would be organized much in the same way as the German  
 European Communities plan studies of the French industrial.  
 It had the advantage over the plan presented in the French  
 Committee in that it did not involve all the members of the  
 EU, just the two most powerful states. Thus, the British  
 leaders would have to deal in time as well as in

<sup>11</sup> "European Community," pp. 111-112, 113.

within the Community. A fate which, because of the nature of the Community and its organizational make-up, would probably be worse than being isolated as an outsider. Additionally it meant that Great Britain would not be included regardless of the results at Brussels on her application. This is the background which led up to the Treaty of Franco-German Cooperation which was signed on January 22, 1963. The question still remains; how long will Germany under a new Chancellor be content to watch France mold a Europe to de Gaulle's image, in which Germany could at best occupy only the position next to the top?

The conclusion of the Franco-German Treaty does not imply an abandonment of de Gaulle's scheme to incorporate the Six into a European Confederation of some sort. The problem for de Gaulle is that the European movement toward federation may have gone too far to halt. At present, he has succeeded in stopping its forward movement, but he may not have the power or skill to bring his plan to fruition. The projects for real political integration, popular vote for the European Parliament, and merging of the executives of the three Communities (EEC, ECSC, and EURATOM) have been shelved for the time being. The next move is President de Gaulle's.



within the Community. A large which, because of the nature  
 of the Community and its responsibilities also-up, would  
 naturally be more than being located in an ordinary. But  
 finally it must be said that these things will not be limited  
 regardless of the future of Germany as they are  
 this is the necessary which led up to the Treaty of Rome  
 German cooperation which was signed on January 22, 1961.  
 The question still remains; how long will Germany under a  
 new Chancellor be content to watch France build a Europe for  
 the world's image, in which Germany could at best occupy  
 only a passive role in the end.  
 The conclusion of the Franco-German Treaty does not  
 imply an abandonment of de Gaulle's scheme to incorporate  
 the six into a European Confederation of some sort. The  
 program for de Gaulle is that the European movement should  
 continue and that the six should be able to do so. At present, the  
 movement is continuing its forward movement, but he may  
 not have the power to call for any new plan to replace  
 the present one. The political situation, however, may  
 for the European movement, and nothing of the sort  
 of the five Community (UK, NL, and BEL) have been  
 known for the time being. The next move is expected to  
 follow.

## II. FRANCE'S EUROPEAN POLICY AND NATO

To gain for France the leadership of a Confederated Europe that will assume pre-eminence as a force in a world of the two super-powers, de Gaulle must first see that France is supreme in Europe. France's power, he believes, after several past "oscillations" in the world power arena, is now on an upward curve which will culminate in her achieving the pinnacle of power as the leader of the Western European grouping. His immediate and central goal in foreign policy is, however, leadership in Europe. All of the tactics and opportunities he has utilized, his demands upon NATO, his intransigence in the United Nations, and the blocking of Britain's entry into Europe, while they have shaken Western unity, are part of his means to achieve his end.

M. Pompidou, the French Prime Minister, told the National Assembly, on April 27, 1962, that France's "European policy has become the very foundation of France's foreign policy."<sup>16</sup> This statement should be a matter of considerable interest and importance to France's partners in NATO and the EEC. This is particularly true in the light of developments after his statement; i.e., the French veto of

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<sup>16</sup> Geoffrey Warner, "President DeGaulle's Foreign Policy," The World Today, 18 (August, 1962), 320.

# THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND NATO

To gain for France the leadership of a Continental Europe that will remain free-minded as a force in a world

of the two superpowers, the British must first see that France is secure in Europe. France's power, he believes, after several years "hesitation" in the world power arena, is now on an upward curve which will coincide in due season with the decline of power of the United States.

European security, his immediate and central goal in foreign policy is, however, inseparable in Europe. All of the factors and opportunities in the world, his demands upon NATO, his intervention in the United Nations, and the

discarding of Britain's army from Europe, while they have been essential only, are part of his means to achieve his end.

In London, the French Prime Minister, told the National Assembly, on April 27, 1961, that France's "European policy" has become the very foundation of France's foreign policy.<sup>12</sup> This statement should be a subject of consideration and interest and importance to France's position in NATO and the EC. This is particularly true in the light of the French view of the statement, i.e., the French view of

<sup>12</sup> "The French view of the statement," *Le Monde*, 1961, 1962.



Great Britain and the signing of the Franco-German Treaty in January, 1963. There is now much speculation on both sides of the Atlantic that de Gaulle's European policy is not aimed solely at altering the balance within the NATO alliance or increasing French influence and prestige in the Council of the NATO powers, but at creating a true "third force" which would stand between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>

Certainly the past writings and speeches of President de Gaulle tend to support this belief and his more recent utterances confirm it. In a speech at Guéret on May 19, 1962, de Gaulle stated:

Political union must take place so that our western Europe will form an entity, so that there will not only be two opposing colossi in the world, but also a great force and a great diffusion of wisdom, and it is Europe alone which can provide this element. . . . But our hope is that the day will come when Europe will play a distinguished role as arbitor of world peace.<sup>18</sup>

What must be clearly understood is that implied in de Gaulle's statement is the fact that the Europe of which he speaks is a Europe under French political guidance. This is, to de Gaulle, the "natural" order of things. Europe, without France as the political leader, would not be capable of exerting the power or influence necessary to act as a

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 324.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., citing Le Monde, May 20 and 21, 1962.

United Nations for the signing of the Human Rights Treaty in January, 1955. There is now much speculation on both sides of the Atlantic that the United Nations policy is not aimed solely at assisting the balance which the NATO allies are so desperately seeking to maintain and preserve in the Council of the NATO powers, but at creating a new "third force" which would stand between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>

Undoubtedly the past weeks and speeches of President de Gaulle have in support of this belief and the more recent statements confirm it. In a speech at United on May 19, 1963, de Gaulle stated:

"Political union must take place so that our western Europe will form an entity, so that there will not only be two opposing colonies in the world, but also a great force and a great civilization of wisdom, and it is Europe alone which can provide this element. . . . But our hope is that the day will come when Europe will play a distinguished role as a center of world peace."<sup>18</sup>

What must be clearly understood is that implied in de Gaulle's statement is the fact that the Europe of which he speaks is a Europe which presents political guarantees. This is the "third force" which is the "third force" without France as the political leader, would not be capable of meeting the needs of European countries so far as a

<sup>17</sup> Washington Post, May 19, 1963.  
<sup>18</sup> Washington Post, May 20, 1963.

true "third force." But with Europe in a "Francofied" political version of European Union, there would emerge a "third force" of Gaullist vision. Speaking at Limoges on May 21, 1962, de Gaulle saw one ultimate result of this.

There will no longer be only the two colossi which we know, there will also be Europe and then, in the last resort, when the virulence of regimes has disappeared - the peoples will come together once more and cooperate.<sup>19</sup>

One further result that the "third force" will bring about will be the raising of the iron curtain. As de Gaulle emphasized at Montbehaud on June 17, 1962:

Then this great Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals - this Europe, with the help of the New World which is its son, will be able to solve the problem of the misery of 2,000 million human beings in the underdeveloped countries.<sup>20</sup>

In a masterpiece of low-keyed French understatement, M. Hervé Alphand, after de Gaulle's January 14 press conference which shocked and all but ruptured the Western alliance, said:

The policies of the French government in two important fields - organization of defense and construction of a United Europe - recently caused a certain amount of turmoil in the Free World.<sup>21</sup>

French foreign policy today, M. Alphand elaborated,

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., citing Le Monde, May 22, 1962.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., citing Le Monde, June 19, 1962.

<sup>21</sup> Herve Alphand, "France and Her Allies," Orbis, VII (Spring, 1963), 17.





contains the twin concepts of alliance and independence. The greatest of these, if there can be a clear separability between the two, is independence. For France to maintain her independence, including her freedom of political action, she must have a national defense that is adequate to defend herself against any possible threat. Such an independent national defense program requires certain political and economic conditions to be met before its desired end can be achieved. France has been able to fulfill these conditions only under de Gaulle.

Today, France's national defense is based upon a re-organized military structure, which is divided into three basic groups. The first force is the one earmarked for the defense of the motherland. A second force is set aside for purposes of intervention, to aid the African countries to which France is bound by defense agreements. This force includes the French forces now stationed in Germany. The third force, politically the most important one, is the strategic nuclear force. This will be covered in greater detail under the section on the Force de Frappe in this chapter.

The second aspect of France's defense policy is the alliance. De Gaulle has stated that he wants to maintain it for as long as the Soviet threat to the world remains. He has stated on numerous occasions that the alliance is

maintain the same course of alliance and independence. The greatest of these is that it shows that we have a clear responsibility between the two, the independence, the freedom to decide our interests, including the extent of official action and that there is national defense that is required to defend against against any possible threat. Such an independence national defense groups require certain political and economic conditions to be met unless the desired end can be achieved. There are some who do not fulfill these conditions only under the best.

Today, America's national defense is based upon a re-organized military structure which is divided into three basic groups. The first group is the one established for the defense of the continent. A second group is set aside for purposes of intervention, and the third group is set aside for what would be known as national agreements. This group includes the United States and Vietnam in Germany. The third group, which is the most important one, is the strategic nuclear force. This will be covered in greater detail when the review of the Force on Force is this subject.

The second aspect of America's defense policy is the alliance. The alliance has shown that we have to maintain it for as long as the United States is the world leader. We are stated as a national mission that the alliance is



"indispensable" to France's survival. He reiterated this same sentiment in his July, 1963, press conference. The form, however, which the alliance adopted in 1949 and the early 1950's, does not appear to him to be adapted to present circumstances and needs.

In the wake of the problems created by the clearly-stated French position in January, 1963, M. Alphand summed up France's political hopes with a word of caution:

In recent months France has been criticized violently not only because of her stand on military strategy but also because of her European policy. It is important that the allies of France be accurately informed about her intentions and goals in Europe.<sup>22</sup>

### III. THE FORCE DE FRAPPE

In December, 1960, the French government enacted its first five-year military program, the central feature of which was the creation of the Force de Frappe. This measure provided for the expenditure over a period, 1960-1964, of more than £350 million for research in the field of nuclear weapons production, £60 million for a strategic bomber force, and £90 million for ballistic missile research.<sup>23</sup> (This

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 24. [Author's italics.]

<sup>23</sup>"The French Nuclear Striking Force," World Today, 19 (August, 1962), 317.



cost figure was later revised to between nine and ten billion new francs or about two billion dollars).

From September until December, 1960, Michael Debré used his full powers of persuasion and coercion to push through the French legislature appropriations for an expanded military establishment in which funds for the controversial Force de Frappe were included. So strong was the opposition to the economic consequences of the program and the burden that it would place upon the French economy, that a motion for censure of the government's policy in July, 1962, over the increased costs of the program, fell just thirty-five votes short of achieving the necessary two-thirds majority to topple the government.<sup>24</sup>

France's independent nuclear force program was organized in two parts. The first objective was to achieve a first generation force based upon fission (atomic) weapons in the lower kiloton ranges, the prototype of which was tested in May, 1962. These weapons, it was planned, would be delivered by a fleet of Mirage IV supersonic medium-range bombers. The French have exploded six atomic devices in their test program, and it was hoped that these weapons would be operational in late 1963, by which time the production

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<sup>24</sup>"modernizing French Defense," The Economist, CCIV (July 21, 1962), 232.



cost figure was then revised to between nine and ten million dollars. From September until December, 1960, General Gorbunov used his full powers of persuasion and coercion to gain through the Soviet intelligence apparatus for an unlimited military establishment in which funds for the construction of the program were included. He argued that the opposition to the program was based on the fact that the burden of the program would fall upon the Soviet economy, that a nation for defense is the government's duty in July, 1961, when the increased cost of the program, \$11.1 billion, was announced. He stated that the necessary twenty-five million more would be achieved by the necessary two-thirds majority to force the government.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet independent nuclear force program was organized in two parts. The first objective was to achieve a first generation force based upon liquid (thermal) weapons in the liquid nitrogen stage, the prototype of which was tested in May, 1961. These weapons, it was planned, would be delivered by a fleet of aircraft in sub-orbital medium-range bombers. The second generation was aimed at the development of a fleet of aircraft in sub-orbital medium-range bombers, and it was hoped that these weapons would be operational in late 1961, at which time the program was completed.

<sup>14</sup> "Development of the Soviet Nuclear Force," *The Washington Post*, July 21, 1961, p. 1.

of the Mirage IV bombers would have begun. This is for the French their "interim system."

The second generation force will take shape in the replacement of the bomber delivery mode with their atomic weapons by a force of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM'S) carrying nuclear warheads. The second part of this program is expected to be ready by 1970.

Perhaps it should be emphasized here that the desire of de Gaulle to create an independent nuclear retaliatory force for France is not an attempt to either weaken NATO or withdraw from the alliance. M. Debré, during the debate in the French Parliament over the Force de Frappe said, "The Western alliance must be maintained and developed. It is essential to the security of Europe and, consequently, of France."<sup>25</sup>

It would appear that de Gaulle not only wants, but at this time needs, the continuance of the alliance to insure America's commitment to Western European defense while France continues to develop her own independent nuclear capability and pursue her own national interests. In the past, the alliance has served to permit France to develop her economy while secure under the United States shield.

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<sup>25</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," International Organization, XV (Summer, 1961), 357-358.





She was even able to denude herself of protective forces while she fought her colonial battles in Indo-China and Algeria. There is no reason to suspect de Gaulle would want to rid France of this continued protection while he perfects his own force, the nucleus of the future Western European force.

France is determined to make her own nuclear force, for as Pierre Messmer, the French Minister of Defense said last year, "there is no defense possible without nuclear arms."<sup>26</sup>

This decision to create her own nuclear force does not imply a lack of confidence in the present United States commitment to defend Western Europe with nuclear arms, though there is some doubt expressed, especially by de Gaulle, about future American resolve. France realizes that there is a great disparity between the power possessed by American nuclear forces and that which the French hope to bring into being. They realize that France needs the U. S. commitment at this time, for the French force when it does come into existence will not be able to compare favorably with either the United States or the Soviet Union for some time to come, if ever. But as M. Messmer pointed out, "what

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<sup>26</sup>"Why a U. S. Ally Insists on Its Own Nuclear Forces," U.S. News and World Report, LIII (September 24, 1962), 70.



we also know is that American nuclear arms both strategic and tactical, are now and will remain at the sole disposition of the President of the United States."<sup>27</sup>

There are two basic reasons for the French development of their Force de Frappe, one is political and the other military.

The political basis rests upon the present nature and structure of the NATO alliance which institutionalizes United States superiority in the military sphere because of our nuclear monopoly in the West. The NATO structure, painstakingly built up from trial and error, has come down relatively unchanged since the early period of NATO integration and today implies no real change in the power relationships between the United States and Europe.

The Europeans feel they are equals with the United States in the defense of the North Atlantic Area and as equals they have a desire to share in the decisions affecting the West's deterrent.

On the military level, the Force de Frappe rests on the nuclear balance existent between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. When America had a world monopoly in nuclear weapons, then the Europeans felt secure behind our strategic "umbrella." Now that America is under the threat of Russian

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid.





rockets, there is real concern that the United States would risk attack to defend Europe. Self-preservation is a powerful influencing factor and as de Gaulle has pointed out on many occasions, Europe cannot be sure the United States will go on forever suffering the risk of nuclear retaliation in defense of Europe. "No matter how strong the links of friendship which bind us to the U. S., and despite the common interests we share, we cannot put our national defense in the hands of the United States indefinitely."<sup>28</sup>

American protestations to the contrary, our guarantee to Europe requires an act of faith on the part of the Europeans which they may understandably not be able to sustain forever. We have stated in effect that France must place her trust in us for an indefinite period for her nuclear force is unnecessary and inimical to the NATO alliance.

As late as July, 1963, de Gaulle in his press conference stated that France must have her own force because the United States has lost its monopoly on nuclear armament and because the Soviets possess great destructive power. It is only natural for the "Americans" to view their own survival as the principal objective of an eventual conflict with the East.

For President de Gaulle, then, a nuclear force is not

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 71.





just a military weapon but a political one as well. He realized in the 1930's, when he advocated a need for tanks, that they were a political as well as a military weapon. A country which possessed solely defensive armaments, such as France with her Maginot Line, "no longer possesses any diplomatic weapon with which to confront a potential adversary."<sup>29</sup> The humiliation of the British and French at Munich confirmed his thesis. France because of her concentration upon a defensive policy and defensive armaments could only bring force to bear upon Hitler not to attack her. She was unable to exert any real pressure to dissuade Hitler, politically or militarily, from attacking Czechoslovakia or any other state. She truly lacked offensive power.

Today, the ultimate offensive weapon is nuclear.

French diplomacy must therefore be backed by a French nuclear force. There can be no political independence without military independence, and political independence is a prerequisite for national ambition.<sup>30</sup>

De Gaulle, in his drive toward achieving political independence through an independent nuclear force, has revealed by his move all the old resentments and forced Europe, as an entity, to reconsider all the old policies of the past

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<sup>29</sup> Alfred Grosser, "General De Gaulle and the Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic," International Affairs, 39 (April, 1963), 203.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 204.

just a military weapon but a political one as well. It  
 existed in the 1930s, when he advocated a need for a  
 that day was a political as well as a military weapon. A  
 country which possessed only defensive weapons, even as  
 France with her 1930s 150,000 troops, was not a  
 nation which was not a political as well as a military weapon.  
 The realization of the British and French in their con-  
 sider the result. France became a law enforcement  
 a defensive policy and defensive weapons would only bring  
 force to bear upon him and to which he, the law  
 to bear any real movement to which he, the law  
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 today, the military situation is not  
 a new diplomatic and therefore to be seen by a  
 nation. There can be no political independence  
 without military independence, and political  
 independence is a necessary condition for  
 to be seen, in the only way, military political  
 independence, which is independent military power, and to  
 be seen by his own all the circumstances and forces which  
 as an ally, to be seen by all the old allies of the past

<sup>23</sup> Allied Powers, General de Gaulle and the Foreign  
 Policy of the United States, International Affairs, 1945  
 (April, 1945), 101.

which have been accepted until recently as the "givens" in the alliance relationships. He has raised, too, the question of whether U. S. nuclear policies are not aimed at maintaining U. S. nuclear monopoly in the alliance and, thus, at perpetuation of U. S. political dominance in Europe.

De Gaulle has cautioned Europe that she must look to the day when she will have to be able to protect herself and her own interests. Europe cannot forever rely upon America or anyone else to carry out this task. It is to one day fill Europe's need that de Gaulle's Force de Frappe is aimed.



which have been recognized until recently as the "given" in the alliance relationship. He has asked, too, the question of whether U.S. nuclear policies are best aimed at maintaining U.S. nuclear superiority in the Alliance and, thus, at preservation of U.S. political dominance in Europe.

De Gaulle has questioned Europe that was made for the day when she will have to be able to protect herself and her own interests. Europe cannot forever rely upon American aid and also to carry out this aim. It is no one day. Tell Europe's hope that de Gaulle's force de frappe is aimed

at the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe, and that it is aimed at the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe.

De Gaulle's policy is aimed at the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe, and it is aimed at the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe.

De Gaulle's policy is aimed at the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe, and it is aimed at the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe.

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## CHAPTER IV

### UNITED STATES ALLIANCE POLICY AND DE GAULLE

The Second World War left the nation-states of Western Europe not only physically weak but also emotionally drained and lethargic. They were incapable of any real constructive efforts or actions which, for a while, created a serious vacuum. Into this political vacuum, the United States was "thrust," by virtue of her immense potential and real power, as the defender of the free world. After this, there was no real sovereignty for the states of Western Europe, except in the most formal sense, for they had to abdicate what control they had exercised in the past over their destiny, their defense, and even over their diplomacy to the United States. This was not a voluntary action but an "inescapable condition of Europe's postwar weakness."<sup>1</sup> This was the period in which American interests in areas of defense and cold-war policy began to exert a great influence upon her European allies.

With the political and economic resurgence of Western Europe, the imbalance which was inherent and accepted in the relationship between the United States and Europe, the

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<sup>1</sup>Ronald Steel, "The Vanishing Deterrent," The New Leader, XLVI (June 24, 1963), 15.

The second World War left the nation-state of Western Europe and only physically weak but also emotionally injured and ideologic. They were incapable of any real comprehensive effort to organize which, for a while, created a nation system. This political vacuum, the United States was "born," by virtue of her immense potential and real power, at the beginning of the new world. After 1945, there was no real sovereignty for the states of Western Europe; except in the past formal sense, for they had no authority over control they had exercised in the past over their destiny. Their defense, and even their internal affairs, in the United States. This was not a voluntary action but a "technical commission of Europe's political weakness." This was the period in which American leadership in terms of defense and economic policy began to exert a great influence upon the European allies.

Relationships between the United States and Mexico, the  
Group, the Americas which was founded and operated in the  
With the political and economic resurgence of Mexico

London, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592,



powerful defender and the weak defended, resulted in a demand by the latter for a larger voice in their own destiny. This was to be expected sooner or later for there no longer existed the conditions which made the relationship so vital in 1949. There now occurred a disturbance in the pattern of relations which many in the United States had come to regard almost as permanent.

The most vocal of the protestations made on Europe's behalf have been made by President de Gaulle, whose press conference of January 14, 1963, was the most challenging to the alliance. The Atlantic alliance, after his pronouncements in January, 1963, moved from an atmosphere of stupor to one of convulsive shock.

As France relates her policies toward Europe and the alliance in terms of the political and military, NATO reflects just such military and political divergencies within the alliance and in Europe. As a military alliance, NATO has striven to protect Western Europe against the Soviet threat of aggression. This has remained its program, relatively unchanged since the early days of force integration in the 1950's. The problems which plague the alliance in this military area are more of "how" than of "why," of means rather than of ends.

There is also NATO the political coalition in which there has been scarcely one subject upon which all the



members have been in agreement. At times, it is difficult to determine when a problem in one area, the military, crosses over and becomes a complicating factor in the finding of a solution in another area, the political. The search for sensible solutions to the alliance's military problems are more often than not bound to complicate the achievement of solutions for the alliance's political difficulties.

#### I. U.S. NATO NUCLEAR POLICY - 1960's

The revision of the United States Defense budget, which President Kennedy sent to Congress in March, 1961, embodied what appeared to many Europeans as a decisive change from the previously-endorsed doctrine of "massive retaliation." It was seen in Europe as a strategic retreat from the proposal for a NATO deterrent force suggested by President Eisenhower in 1960.<sup>2</sup> The American Strategic Air Command (SAC) was believed to be the chief deterrent still against a Soviet attack, but it was now coupled with the "new" concept of beefing up and expanding the conventional European forces to guard against thrusts on a scale just below the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear retaliation by

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<sup>2</sup>"The Two NATOS," The Economist, CXCIX (April 8, 1961), 103.



comparable with that in agreement. At times, it is difficult to determine when a position in one area, the military, remains over and becomes a dominating factor in the hands of a coalition in another area, the political. The search for possible evidence for the alliance's military problems was not often found to coincide with the achievement of balance for the alliance's political difficulties.

#### 1. U.S. Policy Toward the USSR - 1945-1950

The revision to the United States foreign policy, which President Truman took to Congress in March, 1947, embodied one approach to many problems as a decisive change from the previously-embodied doctrine of "containment." It was seen in Europe as a strategic response to the proposal for a NATO defense force suggested by the American government in 1946.<sup>2</sup> The American Strategic Air Command (SAC) was believed to be the most effective ally against a Soviet threat, but it was not coupled with the "great concept of dealing up and coming the operational program force to stand against threats of a Soviet war." Below the use of nuclear weapons, British assistance was

<sup>2</sup>See the report, "The Committee," dated April 6, 1947, 101.

the United States would come only in extremis because of the great threat posed by the Soviet nuclear capability which was aimed at United States cities.

The proposal for NATO to obtain nuclear weapons under NATO control was first voiced by General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at the Sixth Annual NATO Parliamentarians Conference in Paris in November, 1960.<sup>3</sup> In this proposal, General Norstad called for a pool of nuclear weapons to be placed at the disposal of NATO and under NATO's political control. This was subsequently interpreted by the British as meaning there would be fifteen fingers on the NATO nuclear trigger, in which situation twelve or thirteen fingers would be able to overcome, by exerting combined pressure, those dissenting two or three members against its use. The French, on the other hand, saw in this fifteen fingers on the safety catch in which case only one catch need be activated to nullify the weapon's use.

Paul Henri Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO, saw in his backing of the Norstad proposal a panacea for NATO's ills. He believed that it would solve the problems of those countries wishing to possess nuclear arms, provide the alliance with an efficient means of defense, and contribute to the cohesion of the alliance psychologically.

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<sup>3</sup>"NATO Parliamentarians Conference - Crisis of Criticism," NATO Letter, 9 (January, 1961), 15-20.

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE  
BUREAU OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE CONCERNING THE  
ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY  
DURING THE RECENT PAST.

of number appears to be placed at the bottom of the page.

in this fifteen minutes of the article which was  
submitted against the book. The second, in the third week, was  
concerning communist papers, where dissatisfied men in three  
leaves of absence thought would be able to overcome, by  
himself in the State National College, in which situation  
prepared by the National Association of the United States

On his receipt of the written report a general for NATO's  
staff would speak, the Secretary General of NATO, and  
only one action could be authorized to nullify the weapon's use.

allowance with the National Board of Directors, and contribute  
 Committee elected to review business plan, provide for  
 like. He believed that it would allow the business to obtain



The Eleventh Annual Ministerial Council Review in Paris, December 16-18, 1960, saw the formal United States presentation of General Norstad's plan. Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, put forth the new concept which included an offer of five ballistic missile submarines for NATO with their complement of eighty Polaris missiles, by the end of 1963. He proposed also that NATO discuss a multilateral system for political control of the missile's nuclear weapons and suggested that the other NATO members, as their quid pro quo, contribute another one hundred more missiles to the NATO force which would be bought in the United States.<sup>4</sup>

These proposals, made under the Eisenhower administration, were not in line with the Kennedy advisors' concept of centralization and control of the West's nuclear deterrent. President Kennedy seemed reluctant to furnish a Polaris deterrent force to NATO, and the plan fell through at the Oslo Ministerial meeting of May 8-10, 1961.<sup>5</sup> Officially, the United States was prepared, in an announcement made by the United States Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to commit five U.S. Polaris submarines to the forces assigned

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<sup>4</sup>News item in The New York Times, December 17, 18, and 19, 1960. Also see The Times [London], December 17, 18, and 19, 1960.

<sup>5</sup>"International Organizations: Summary of Activities - NATO," International Organization, XV (Summer, 1961), 524-526.

The following Annual Statistical Council Review is  
 cited, December 18-19, 1950, and the Council United States  
 presentation of General Secretary's plan. Secretary of State,  
 Christian A. Hoffman, has forth the new concept which is  
 divided on lines of five political entities comprising the  
 NATO with their complement of eight political entities, by the  
 end of 1953. It proposed that NATO discuss a multi-  
 lateral system for political control of the Atlantic's  
 political system and suggested that the other NATO members,  
 as their only and only candidate should be invited to  
 discuss to the NATO forum which would be sought in the  
 United States.

These proposals, made under the Eisenhower administration,  
 were not in line with the Kennedy administration's concept  
 of centralization and control of the world's nuclear order.  
 Kennedy's administration seemed inclined to pursue a  
 policy of defense force to NATO, and the plan call for  
 as the late statistical review of May 1-10, 1951, call  
 clearly, the United States was prepared, in its commitment  
 with the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to  
 commit five U.S. political entities to the NATO system.

<sup>1</sup>When this is the case, December 17, 18,  
 and 19, 1950. Also see the Statistical Review, December 17, 18,  
 and 19, 1950.

<sup>2</sup>Statistical Organization, Secretary of State -  
 Statistical Organization, at Washington, D.C., 1951, 115-116.

to NATO. The plan, however, since it was contingent upon the Europeans buying one hundred missiles for NATO in the United States, was rejected as being too costly. Doubts had also been expressed concerning the feasibility of political control over such a force. It was realized that, under the statutory limitations then in existence, ultimate control over the nuclear warheads of such a force would revert to the President of the United States.

President Kennedy referred to this NATO force in his speech before the Canadian Parliament on May 17, 1962, but it appeared plain that the initiative for bringing the force into being would have to come from the Europeans.

We look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies, once NATO's nonnuclear goals have been achieved.<sup>6</sup>

The lack of a nuclear force for NATO meant that there would have to be a corresponding increase in men and conventional weapons to meet the new concept of expanded conventional forces to deter any aggressive moves short of total nuclear war. This resulted, in turn, in political complications as to which countries should furnish the additional men and who should pay for what proportion of the rising

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<sup>6</sup>"The Common Aims of Canada and the United States," Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (June 5, 1962), 841. [*Italics added.*]



in 1947. The point, however, is that it was considered that the Europeans trying to maintain their own status in the United States, was rejected as being too costly. Canada had also been expressing concern about the feasibility of political control over such a force. It was decided that, under the emergency situation then in existence, without control over the national resources of such a force would result in the abandonment of the United States.

It was also decided to refer to this force as the "Special Forces" and to include in the definition of this force the term "Special Forces" as used in the United States. It was also decided that the definition of this force should be as broad as possible and that the definition should be as broad as possible.

It was also decided to include in the definition of this force the term "Special Forces" as used in the United States. It was also decided that the definition of this force should be as broad as possible and that the definition should be as broad as possible.

The term "Special Forces" as used in the United States should be as broad as possible and that the definition should be as broad as possible. It was also decided that the definition of this force should be as broad as possible and that the definition should be as broad as possible.

costs in maintaining the alliance forces. At the same time, it led to the larger political implication of lessening, in the long run, the United States credibility to use its nuclear weapons to defend Europe. The ever-tightening control desired by the United States over the West's deterrent forces increased the tempo for independent nuclear forces within the alliance to offset the gaps which the Europeans felt were being created by American policies. Furthermore, the U.S. proposal to place Polaris submarines under NATO control really did not go very far in satisfying European and French desires for an adequate voice in the policy decisions affecting the West's nuclear forces. The Polaris submarines to be lent to NATO would be in the same category as United States forces committed to NATO, but would coordinate with NATO strategy and with the non-NATO United States forces. In other words, "under the arrangements that we have in force, American warheads remain in American custody."<sup>7</sup>

American policy, as advocated by Secretary of Defense McNamara, was clearly shown in his speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on June 16, 1962. The American concept of

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<sup>7</sup>"Secretary Rusk Attends CENTO, NATO, and ANZUS Meetings" (CBS interview with Secretary of State Rusk, May 6, 1962), Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (May 28, 1962), 863-864.





counterforce strategy was that

. . . principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be in the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.<sup>8</sup>

This policy meant that nuclear forces would only possess the power of deterrence if they were large and powerful enough to undertake the task of acting as a counterforce. Such a requirement in the West's defensive potential could only be met by the United States capability; therefore, all national nuclear forces were unnecessary, expensive, not credible, and injurious to the alliance.

In particular, relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence.

. . . . .

In short, then, limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear contribution to the alliance is neither obsolete nor dispensable.

At the same time, the general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction.<sup>9</sup>

In an attempt to dissuade the Europeans, particularly the French, from constructing their own independent nuclear

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<sup>8</sup>"Defense Arrangements of the North Atlantic Community," Department of State Bulletin, XLVII (July 9, 1962), 67.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 67-68.

comprehensive strategy was that

1. A strategic military objective in the event of a nuclear war would be to destroy the enemy's command and control system, and to destroy the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.<sup>2</sup>

This policy meant that nuclear forces would only become an instrument of deterrence if they were large and powerful enough to undertake the task of acting as a counterforce. Such a requirement in the West's defensive posture could only be met by the United States capability; therefore, all nuclear nuclear forces were unnecessary, expensive, not credible, and injurious to the alliance.

In particular, relatively small nuclear forces would be insufficient to destroy the enemy's command and control system, and to destroy the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.<sup>3</sup>

As a result, the United States' defensive posture, being fundamentally, its deterrent, was not a counterforce posture, and looking for credibility as a deterrent. Clearly, the United States nuclear posture was not a counterforce posture, and it was not a deterrent posture.

At the same time, the general strategy I have been discussing was not a counterforce strategy, and it was not a deterrent strategy, and it was not a counterforce strategy.

In the United States, the strategy, posture, and posture, from a counterforce posture, was not a deterrent posture, and it was not a counterforce posture.

<sup>2</sup> "The United States' nuclear posture, as it has evolved since 1945, is a counterforce posture, and it is not a deterrent posture." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1978.

forces, the United States built up elaborate and formidable technical arguments. The McNamara speech was one of the methods by which our views on this were made clear to the Europeans.

The emphasis placed by the United States upon the doctrine of counterforce was also designed to convince the Europeans that the quest for nuclear independence was not possible, because to support such a doctrine required a large massive nuclear arsenal which the Europeans did not possess. While the new doctrine, it was hoped, would soothe the fears of the Europeans, it had just the opposite affect. It seemed reasonable to the Europeans that the latest United States strategy was designed with the idea, at least in part, of insuring its permanent nuclear monopoly in the alliance.

The fade-out of counterforce theory came with the hardening of the Soviet missile sites and the construction by the U.S.S.R. of a force of missile launching submarines. The nuclear stalemate which resulted between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. seemed to have made total war between the two irrational and this, in turn, has led to larger European demand for a more credible deterrent, at least one they could believe in--and this meant one of their own which they could count upon at all times and under all circumstances.

In the immediate postwar period, the formation of a



However, the United States will up its ante in the  
 technical requirements. The requirements are one of the  
 methods by which we view on this side and clear in the  
 European.

The measure aimed by the United States from the  
 doctrine of commitment was also designed to convince the  
 Europeans that the road for nuclear independence was not  
 possible, because to support such a doctrine required a  
 large massive nuclear arsenal which the Europeans did not  
 possess. While the new doctrine, it was hoped, would remove  
 the fears of the Europeans, it had the opposite effect.  
 It seemed reasonable to the Europeans that the United States  
 nuclear strategy was linked with the idea, at least in  
 part, of achieving the permanent nuclear monopoly in the  
 Atlantic.

The fact that the commitment theory goes with the  
 according to the nuclear missile which was the foundation  
 by the U.S.A.R. of a force of nuclear launching capability,  
 the nuclear strategy which resulted between the U.S.A. and  
 the U.S.A.R. seemed to have been built on a shaky base for  
 investment and there is doubt that the United States  
 feared that a more realistic approach, at least the way  
 could follow it—and this meant not to build two sides long  
 would mean that at all times the world was threatened  
 in the immediate future period, the likelihood of a

joint command and integrated forces for NATO were fully acceptable to most of the Europeans. They were willing to limit or even abrogate their sovereignty to the extent which was necessary for this centralization of command. In reality this could only have been an American one. So long as they felt safe under the benevolent protection of our nuclear "umbrella," there was no great quarrel with the system.

Today, the situation has taken a different turn with the increasing uncertainty of whether the United States would use its nuclear power to defend Europe in spite of the Soviet rocket threat. "Fears of American reluctance to incinerate themselves in the cause of European freedom are not new."<sup>10</sup> The Europeans are not quick to forget that it was our Secretary of State, Christian Herter, who in a statement before the United States Foreign Relations Committee on April 21, 1959, said, "I cannot conceive of any President engaging in all-out nuclear war unless we were in danger of all-out devastation ourselves."<sup>11</sup>

The Europeans felt, furthermore, that if the United States did have an invulnerable second-strike capability, whether counterforce or counterstrike, we might possibly

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<sup>10</sup> Editorial in The Times [London], January 5, 1962.

<sup>11</sup> George Lichtheim, The New Europe Today - and Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 31.





write off our military commitments to Europe rather than permit ourselves at some future time to be placed at the mercy of our allies' precipitous actions.<sup>12</sup>

Then, there is the ever-changing international situation which, as M. Herve Alphanand stated, may in five, ten, or even fifteen years from now be so altered that French national interests may find themselves threatened, but not those of her allies.<sup>13</sup> This can easily be turned around to mean that, at some future time, the interests of the allies, particularly the United States, may not coincide with those of France. If this should become the case, then the French must obtain a nuclear force to enable them to speak with a "voice" that will be heard in the councils of the super-powers regardless of the action which her allies will take. Against such hoped-for political gains, the technical arguments advanced by the United States against independent nuclear forces on the military level were irrelevant to de Gaulle.

The existence of the "special relationship" which developed between Great Britain and the United States, and which grew in the area of sharing nuclear material and

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 31-32.

<sup>13</sup>Herve Alphanand, "France and Her Allies," Orbis, VII (Spring, 1963), 20.

while the military movements in China have been  
 permitted to move at their own pace and at the  
 same time to the military movements.<sup>12</sup>  
 Then, there is the ever-changing international situa-  
 tion which, as Mr. Harve A. Boardman, says in 1954, has  
 been different from what it was in 1949, and it  
 is not likely that it will be the same in 1955, but not  
 likely that it will be the same in 1956, and not  
 likely that it will be the same in 1957.<sup>13</sup> This can easily be turned around to  
 mean that, as time goes by, the interests of the allies,  
 particularly the United States, may not coincide with those  
 of France. It is this which makes the case for the French  
 must obtain a nuclear force to enable them to speak with a  
 voice that will be heard in the councils of the world.  
 power regardless of the action which the allies will take.  
 Against such a background of political gains, the political agree-  
 ment between the United States and France against independent  
 nuclear forces on the military level was necessary to  
 be made.

The existence of the "special relationship" which  
 developed between Great Britain and the United States, and  
 which grew in the area of nuclear and other related matters

<sup>12</sup> Boardman, p. 15-16.

<sup>13</sup> Boardman, p. 15-16. (Boardman, 1954, p. 15-16.)

information, was made more binding by the enactment of the MacMahon Act. The French interpreted this statute as being specifically designed to aid Great Britain and keep France out of the circle of nuclear powers in the alliance.

The United States justified its action in not taking France into the "special relationship" as we did Great Britain, because of her poor security system and because of the specific requirements laid down by the Congress. The amendment to the Atomic Energy Act stated, in effect, that information and materials in connection with the design and manufacture of atomic weapons could be given only to those nations which had convinced the United States that they had made substantial progress in manufacturing this type of weapon. The French were quick to understand the implications of this--the key to parity with the United Kingdom in the Western alliance lay in the development of a national atomic program. Later, however, after she had achieved her successful test explosion in the Sahara, she found that she was still no closer to achieving a privileged status. The United States was as adamant as ever about sharing her secrets with France. The United States argument took the form now of wanting to prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons and for this reason saw fit to deny France information which would prove of vast aid to her in the development of a nuclear force.



information was also being by the Government of the  
 Republic of the Congo. The Congo Government is being  
 specifically warned to aid Great Britain and West Africa  
 out of the kind of nuclear power is the situation.  
 The United States position is that it is not taking  
 France into the "special relationship" as we did Great  
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 the economic requirements laid down by the Congress. The  
 Government of the Atomic Energy Act stated, in effect, that  
 information and materials in connection with the design and  
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 nations which had convinced the United States that they had  
 adequate technical progress in manufacturing this type of  
 weapon. The French were given no understanding of this  
 kind of thing--the way to really give the United States an  
 idea of what is going on in the development of a national  
 atomic program. Later, however, after we had achieved our  
 technological goals specified in the Atomic Energy Act and the  
 way still to remain as a privileged status. The  
 United States was as almost as well about making her  
 secret with France. The United States Government took the  
 form now of wanting to prevent the proliferation of atomic  
 weapons and this means that the United States Government  
 also could make sure of what is going on in the development  
 of a nuclear power.

Even after the passage of an American-French nuclear agreement in 1961, the United States found ways to avoid supplying information and materials to establish a force which would be "inimical" to the alliance.<sup>14</sup> Article I, "General Provisions," of the Agreement is so worded that it conforms with the security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Sections 91c and 144b), which leaves a considerable amount of room for the Party transferring information.<sup>15</sup>

Article I is set forth as follows:

While the United States and France are participating in an international arrangement for their mutual defense and security and making substantial and material contributions thereto, each Party will communicate to and exchange with the other Party information and transfer non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data to the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, provided that the communicating or transferring Party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, there exists a statutory means of providing France with the information which would make her task, in

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<sup>14</sup>The "Agreement for Cooperation in the Operation of Atomic Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes," was signed in Paris on July 27, 1961, and entered into force on October 9, 1961; Department of State Bulletin, XLV (October 30, 1961), 733.

<sup>15</sup>Department of State Bulletin, XLV (October 2, 1961), 558.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 559.

...from which the receipt of an American-French nuclear agreement in 1947, the United States found ways to avoid supplying information and materials to maintain a force which would be "minimal" to the alliance.<sup>14</sup> Article 1, "General provisions," of the Agreement is so worded that it contains within the security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 language the said right, which leaves a considerable amount of room for the fairly unrestricted interchange.

#### Article 2 is set forth as follows:

While the United States and France are participating in an international arrangement for fully mutual defense and security and making substantial and material contributions thereto, each Party will continue to and exchange with the other Party information and transfer technology, data or atomic weapons systems involving materials used in the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, provided that the communication of plans, training data, technical data and computer data to its defense and security.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, there exists a secondary source of providing France with the information which would have been lost, in

<sup>14</sup> The Agreement for Cooperation in the Operation of Atomic Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes, was signed in Paris on July 27, 1947, and entered into force on October 9, 1947. Journal of State Relations, 227 (November 26, 1947), 717.

<sup>15</sup> Journal of State Relations, 227 (October 2, 1947), 688.



constructing a nuclear force, easier and much less expensive. It has not been United States policy, however, to so implement the provisions of the agreement.

Concerning the seemingly-ambiguous policy pursued by the United States toward Great Britain and France in relation to the establishment of independent nuclear forces, M. Alphand asked a question to which many have sought the answer: "Why should a policy be considered reasonable when it is Britain's policy and dangerous or ridiculous when it becomes the policy of France?"<sup>17</sup>

## II. THE NASSAU AGREEMENT

The meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau in the Bahamas on December 19-21, 1962, saw a greater change in the NATO alliance and the U.S.-British special relationship, than had occurred since 1956 at Suez. Far more was at stake than the obvious discussion of Skybolt. To the British, the conference was greeted as no less than an all-out attempt to reduce the independent nuclear power of Great Britain. It seemed to them an all too logical follow-up in the light of Defense Secretary McNamara's statements at Ann Arbor six months earlier. While the Defense Secretary explained shortly

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<sup>17</sup>Alphand, loc. cit.



after his speech that he had not intended to include Great Britain in his remarks against those states with "limited nuclear capabilities," there was little doubt, especially after the conference, that Great Britain was just as much a target as France.

The United States policy toward the alliance in regard to nuclear weapons was most clearly revealed at Nassau, where our "anti-proliferation" policy was at its zenith. Since we felt unable to extend to France the "special status" we had given to the British, we went a long way toward meeting French objections by greatly abrogating Great Britain's independent nuclear potential. The agreement at Nassau seemed to indicate that "continuance of special status for Britain now is undesirable."<sup>18</sup>

By pleading increasing costs and technical difficulties in the development of the Skybolt missile, which problems became readily apparent shortly after we talked Great Britain into the Skybolt project and abandoning her Blue Streak missile, we managed to cancel, to a great extent, the last remnant of exclusive British control over their nuclear force. A working Skybolt, which would have been capable of being launched from a bomber of the British "V"

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<sup>18</sup>Malcolm W. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence," Foreign Affairs, 41 (January, 1963), 290.



that the United States has not intended to include itself  
in the nuclear arms race. The United States has always been  
opposed to nuclear armaments, especially  
those that are not necessary for the defense of the United States.  
The United States has always been opposed to nuclear armaments  
that are not necessary for the defense of the United States.

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that are not necessary for the defense of the United States.

Bomber Force, would have supplied the British with an independent deterrent free from U.S. control. But with the cancellation of the Blue Streak and concentration upon the Skybolt, the British had pinned all their hopes for retaining an independent force upon American ability and willingness to develop Skybolt. The cancellation of the Skybolt project by the United States and the inability of the British to continue with the project independently left the British no alternative but to accept the American counter-proposal for a seaborne force of Polaris missiles and ships. These would be deployed and "targeted" in agreement with the United States, which would give the United States a greater measure of control over Great Britain's nuclear deterrent than was ever enjoyed over the "V" Bomber Force. The British reaction was extremely bitter against this inescapable fact.

The plain truth is that during the last fortnight Britain has suffered a crushing politico-military defeat which has revealed our real weakness even more pointedly than at Suez. For we have been obliged, at pistol point, to carry out a fundamental reorganization of our basic defence policies in a matter of 48 hours, as the result of a single administrative decision taken in Washington.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to restructuring the role of Britain as a nuclear power within the alliance, the Skybolt cancellation was also a financial windfall. While the United States was

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<sup>19</sup>"The Vanishing Deterrent," New Statesman, LXIV (December 28, 1962), 918.





given more de facto control over the British deterrent, at no real cost to the United States, the development cost of Skybolt was saved and this was expected to exceed \$2.5 billion. At the same time, as the United States was pushing its anti-proliferation and centralization of control upon a reluctant British government, it was reactivating the long-quiescent Eisenhower-Norstad proposal for a NATO seaborne force. By offering to the French the same proposal which we offered Great Britain, we hoped to appease some of de Gaulle's criticisms by showing him that now France and Great Britain were equals. There was now, in fact, no "special-relationship."

The United Kingdom had an "ace-in-the-hole" which she chose not to play, much to de Gaulle's disdain, and this was the possibility of turning away from her relationship with the United States and bringing her own nuclear force into Europe. This force, when merged with the French, would form the nucleus of a true "third force" in Western Europe. It is interesting that just such ideas began to be hinted by the British in coincidence with doubts, expressed and implied, by the United States over the merits of the Skybolt system. The New York Times carried a story in which it was reported that "the British Government now believes in the establishment of a European nuclear deterrent."<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Drew Middleton, "Britain Supports New Atom Force for Europeans," News item in The New York Times, November 4, 1962.

given which is large compared with the United States, at no  
 time was the United States, the development cost of the  
 oil was saved and this was expected to exceed \$1.5 billion.  
 At the same time, as the United States was pouring its oil-  
 production and consumption of oil, upon a relatively  
 modest government, it was subsidizing the long-distance  
 Eisenhower-Eisenhower program for a NATO member. In  
 respect to the United States, the same program which was offered  
 Great Britain, we hoped to discuss some of the details of  
 Britain's showing and that our terms and Great Britain was  
 special. There was one in fact, no "special-relationship".  
 The United States had no "special-relationship" with the  
 other and we play, much in the United States, and this was  
 the possibility of reaching any firm relationship with  
 the United States and changing the United States into  
 Europe. This was, which helped with the United States, would have  
 the mission of a "third force" in Europe. It  
 is interesting that just such ideas were to be shared by  
 the United States with Britain, suggested that the  
 United States was the center of the Europe  
 system. The New York Times carried a story in which it was  
 reported that "The British Government has decided in the  
 establishment of a European nuclear defense".<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> "The British Government has decided in the establishment of a European nuclear defense", New York Times, December 4, 1951.

The result which this had upon United States officials was observed at the NATO Council meeting in December, at which time it was reported that:

There are signs, however, that they may be concerned about the effect of leaving Britain entirely without a role in the nuclear deterrent strategy; this it is felt may drive Britain into some sort of close association with France in the development of ballistic missiles.<sup>21</sup>

Nothing came of these fears on the part of United States officials as Great Britain chose to remain in close relationship with the United States despite what it might cost her. On December 18, 1962, Mr. Thorneycroft, in a House of Commons speech, tried to prepare for the inevitable when he voiced his doubts on the feasibility and costs of Skybolt. He made mention of the fact that it was not developing as was hoped and would be delayed in reaching the operational stage. There was an alternative which might be had and would be more accurate, the Polaris missile.<sup>22</sup> This was what was obtained at Nassau. The story, as carried in The Times on December 22, 1962, made it appear as if it was a victory for the Macmillan government. "Mr. Macmillan Rejects Skybolt Offer on Grounds of Cost."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>News item in The Times [London], December 13, 1962.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., December 18, 1962.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., December 22, 1962.



The results which this has upon United States efforts

will be observed at the NATO Council meeting in December.

At present time it was reported that

There are signs, however, that they may be coming  
around about the subject of leaving Berlin entirely  
without a vote in the Western European Assembly.  
This is a fairly new development and some sort of  
close consultation with France in the development of  
policy is essential.<sup>21</sup>

Nothing came of these talks on the part of United

States officials as great efforts must be made to clear

relationship with the United States before it might

cost them. On December 18, 1961, Mr. Eisenhower, in a

speech of comments on the subject, tried to explain the importance

when he voiced his doubts on the feasibility and costs of

it. He made mention of the fact that it was not feasible

going on as was hoped and would be delayed in reaching the

operational stage. There was an understanding which might be

had and would be very important, the Soviet missile.<sup>22</sup> This

was what was expected at present. The story, as quoted in

The Times on December 15, 1961, made it appear as if it was

a strategy for the smaller government. Mr. Kennedy

refused to make any other statement in 1961.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup>How far is the United States, December 15, 1961.

<sup>22</sup>The Times, December 18, 1961.

<sup>23</sup>The Times, December 15, 1961.

As far as de Gaulle was concerned, the Nassau agreement only proved further his thesis that Great Britain was just acting as an agent for United States policy in Europe. Under the circumstances, it appeared not too illogical an assumption.

Regarding the American proposal for a multilateral nuclear force with French participation, de Gaulle, as expected, rejected it upon grounds which were familiar to all within the alliance. As Pierre Messmer had stated, the concept of a NATO nuclear force had been under discussion ever since its proposal at the NATO Ministerial meeting in 1960. Since then, all the speeches, conferences, and statements have led nowhere. "They cannot lead anywhere as long as the United States refuses to give up its absolute control over nuclear weapons."<sup>24</sup>

The technical reason for the French rejection of the nuclear force was that if she were to buy Polaris missiles from the United States, she was not absolutely certain that she would be able to build the warheads to fit them or the submarines to launch them. In addition, such a purchase would hit the relatively new French aero-space industry in a strategic place, its finances.

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<sup>24</sup>"Why a U. S. Ally Insists on Its Own Nuclear Forces," op. cit., p. 71.

At the 1946 session, the General Assembly  
 had only given limited attention to the  
 fact that in 1945 the United States policy in Europe  
 had been completely changed, it appeared not too difficult to  
 recognize.

Regarding the American proposal for a multilateral  
 economic force with French participation, in 1946, as re-  
 ported, rejected it upon grounds which were similar to all  
 other the alliance. In 1946, however, had stated, the con-  
 cept of a NATO economic force had been abandoned over  
 since the proposal at the NATO ministerial meeting in 1946.  
 Since then, all the economic, commercial, and statistical  
 data had shown, "they cannot lead anywhere as long as the  
 United States continues to give up the economic control over  
 European economy."

The American proposal for the French rejection of the  
 economic force was that it was more to help Europe's economic  
 from the United States, and not especially certain that  
 the world was able to build the economic to the point of the  
 economic to French level, in addition, such a measure  
 would not be relatively new French economic industry in a  
 strategic sense, the United States.



The political reasons were, perhaps, better known if not completely understood. To accept the American offer would mean that France would either have to construct a duplicate force for NATO use while building her own independent deterrent or completely place her nuclear arms under NATO control. The former was an absolute financial impossibility, for France was finding the financial going difficult in building her force. The latter was just as impossible for it went against the Gaullist policy of independence from America and her principle of obtaining her own completely independent deterrent force.

The French, thus, viewed the activities at Nassau as but another United States maneuver to place France and Europe in a permanent position of inferiority to the United States and, in this, they saw Great Britain as the accomplice of the United States. The entry of Great Britain, especially after Nassau, into the Common Market was viewed as the vehicle by which America would try to exert its influence in the EEC, with the hope of eventually subverting it to the status of an economic satellite.

The French find it difficult to understand why the United States, which was before Nassau only lukewarm on the multilateral force idea, did an about-face in trying to sell it to the Europeans. This was especially true after we had

The political system was, perhaps, better known in  
 not completely understood. To make the American offer  
 would mean that France would either have to surrender a  
 significant force for NATO and while holding her own independent  
 one remained on completely place her nuclear force under  
 NATO control. The former was an absolute financial impos-  
 sibility; the latter was threatening the financial going dis-  
 ease in holding her force. The latter was just as  
 impossible as it was to accept the American policy of inde-  
 pendence from America and her principle of obtaining her own  
 completely independent national force.

The French, however, viewed the withdrawal as a means to  
 not another United States message to place France and  
 Europe in a permanent position of inferiority to the United  
 States and, on this, they saw Great Britain as the neces-  
 sary ally of the United States. The entry of Great Britain,  
 especially after 1954, into the Common Market was viewed  
 as the vehicle by which France would try to reach its inde-  
 pendence in the EC, with the hope of eventually withdrawing it  
 to the status of an economic satellite.

The French view is difficult to understand why the  
 United States, while not before Britain only interested in the  
 withdrawal force then, did so much more in trying to sell  
 it to the Europeans. This was especially true after the

previously stated that the alliance has no urgent need for a European contribution in nuclear forces.

Insistence by the United States upon a nuclear monopoly has not acted as a brake upon proliferation. It implies strongly, as Secretary McNamara stated, that only the "right" people should have them and control them. The mistrust shown Europe by the United States has been reciprocated by President de Gaulle, who has said that in the end Europe can depend only on herself and not others for aid.

Since a NATO nuclear force can add but little to the West's overall deterrent, mainly because of America's great arsenal of nuclear weapons, then the only reason for advocating such a force on the part of the U. S. must be political. By this means, the United States hopes to allay the European critics of U.S. NATO policy and nuclear monopoly, and to give them a larger voice in this area. However, de Gaulle knows as well as we do that a real voice in these matters cannot come until the Europeans are permitted to have a real say in when the missiles are to be launched, if ever. This can never come about under present statutory limitations, and de Gaulle knows this also. Therefore, all our efforts in this direction will be for naught because they do not really meet the requirements of the Europeans.



previously stated that the Alliance has no right to act for a European organization in a similar manner.

Insistence by the United States upon a complete monopoly was met with as a desire for self-determination. In fact, monopoly, as American business stated, was only the "right" people should have over and control their own economic power. By the United States has been recognized by the United States, that has said that in the end Europe was bound to be self-sufficient and not subject to the will of a few nations. It was not that the United States was to have a monopoly of the world, mainly because of America's great economic and political power. When the world came to the edge of a crisis, it was to be the United States that was to be the political center. By this means, the United States hopes to keep the European states of the world policy and nuclear monopoly, and to give them a larger voice in the world. However, the United States as well as to do that a real voice in the world cannot come until the European states are united to have a real voice in the world. The United States will not be satisfied, if it can have more power than the United States. Therefore, the United States will not be satisfied with the United States. The United States will not be satisfied with the United States. The United States will not be satisfied with the United States.

### III. THE BRUSSELS BREAKDOWN

The breakdown in the Brussels negotiations on the British Government's bid for admission to the Community of the Six would have been somewhat anti-climatic had it not been for the dramatic and brutal way President de Gaulle ended the talks. While there were many who criticized the manner in which the talks were halted, it did make for a clean break, "and a clean break was what everybody was praying for in those final weeks, not a fuzzy epilogue stained with tears and jejune funeral orations."<sup>25</sup> Despite the British assertions to the contrary, the talks at Brussels had not been getting on very well and were not as certain of success as many were led to believe. Further, the "Five" were not consistently siding with the British against the French during the negotiations.

The news conference of January 14, 1963, made it clear that the French rejection of the British application for membership into the EEC was, in a large measure, based upon de Gaulle's belief that Great Britain was tied too close to the United States and, for this reason, was not "truly" European. The rejection was also a Gaullist reaction to what were supposedly United States policies

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<sup>25</sup>Thomas Barman, "Behind the Brussels Breakdown," International Affairs, 39 (July, 1963), 363.

The response in the Brussels negotiations on the British Government's aid for admission to the Community of the six would have been somewhat ambivalent and it has been for the dramatic and brutal way described in 1961 noted the failure. This failure was not only the manner in which the talks were held, it was also for a clear reason, "and a clear reason was that everybody was trying for the same thing, not a thing which seemed with little or (some) tactical objectives,"<sup>12</sup> despite the British attitude to the contrary, the talks as a whole had not been getting on very well and were not as certain of success as they were led to believe. Further, the five were not consistently aiding with the British against the French during the negotiations.

The next occurrence of January 11, 1961, was a clear case of the French rejection of the British application for membership into the EEC was, in a sense, based upon the British's belief that Great Britain was tied too close to the United States and, for this reason, was not "early" enough. The rejection was also a British rejection of what was supposedly United States policy.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas G. B. "The British and the European Community," *International Affairs*, 38 (1962), 182.



directed at subverting the European Community to conform to American interests. De Gaulle has, for a long period, believed that American "prodding" of the British to become a part of the "new" Europe, was solely to gain a foothold in the Community and thereby prevent the development of independent European diplomacy.<sup>26</sup> De Gaulle feared that Britain in the Common Market would represent an American "Trojan Horse" with all the attendant disruptive consequences that could be expected as the result of this maneuver.

Great Britain's acquiescence to United States blandishments, arguments, and "take it or leave it" proposal at Nassau, firmed de Gaulle's resolve not to admit Great Britain into the EEC. Had Great Britain used her option and made the "correct" choice, severed her special ties with the United States, and brought her "V" Bombers and nuclear know-how to Europe, de Gaulle would have looked upon British entry in a different light. As it was, Great Britain, by permitting a vital attribute of her national sovereignty--her nuclear deterrent--to become dependent upon the United States, had made the "wrong" choice. Great Britain, in maintaining her ties with the United States, disqualified herself as a European power.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ronald Steel, "The General's European Campaign," The New Leader, XLVI (February 4, 1963), 15.

<sup>27</sup>Edmond Taylor, "After Brussels," The Reporter, 28 (February 14, 1963), 29.



During the Cuban confrontation, de Gaulle received several reports from French intelligence sources that, in secret talks and communications between Washington and the Kremlin, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev were in substantial agreement over such issues as Berlin, U. S. missile bases in Italy and Turkey, and a nuclear test ban. De Gaulle believed that any agreements which would arise from these secret negotiations and to which he was not a party, would be at the expense of Western Europe and France.<sup>28</sup>

Prodded by his desire not to be faced with a fait accompli by the super-powers and his very real apprehension over further American incursions into Europe economically, he acted faster than he had planned. De Gaulle believed that since Great Britain had shown she was acting as a U.S. puppet, that he and France were the only ones to prevent Europe from being crushed by agreements between the two very great powers.<sup>29</sup> With this as the background for his precipitous action in intervening in the Brussels talks, de Gaulle hoped to gain more, in the long run, than he lost, especially

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<sup>28</sup>George W. Herald, "Charles DeGaulle's Abstractions," The New Leader, XLVI (February 18, 1963), 14.

<sup>29</sup>Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960's, The Implications of Interdependence (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 67.





in regard to the other members of the EEC whom he had no time to consult.

The test ban that came to fruition in the summer of 1963 and which de Gaulle rejected supported his previous intelligence information, but it did not change his attitude. "France will not be diverted by the Moscow agreements from equipping herself with the means of immeasurable destruction possessed by the other powers."<sup>30</sup> The test ban appears to de Gaulle as a prelude to greater negotiations covering other areas "notably European questions" which in the absence of the Europeans "runs counter to the view of France."<sup>31</sup>

De Gaulle has achieved his purpose, for the time being at least, by denying Great Britain membership in the European Community. It remains to be seen just how long he can hold to this position in the face of European opposition to his policy. The time table for the aging President is growing short. He must consolidate his position for France in Europe before the EEC switches over to a majority vote in 1966.

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<sup>30</sup>Press Conference of President de Gaulle in The New York Times, July 30, 1963.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

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## CHAPTER V

### DE GAULLE'S POLICIES AND NATO

Possibly the greatest single effect which the policies of France under de Gaulle's leadership have produced is a new awareness of the changed nature of old relationships within the alliance. The French President's remarks of January 14, 1963, indicated more clearly than every before that the Europeans desired these changes to be recognized and understood by the United States. The relationships which had existed when NATO became an integrated politico-military alliance had become altered over the years. The situation which made the commitment of the United States to Western Europe's defense in peacetime had also changed. France, as the leader of the movement in the "new" Europe, gave voice to this undercurrent of European feeling; Europe has a right to a greater voice in matters affecting her future destiny and in the control of those forces which could involve the constituent states of Europe. In such an eventuality as a conflict between the two great nuclear powers, Europe could conceivably find herself crushed between two great wills.

#### I. THE CHANGED SITUATION

There is today, within the alliance, no great sense

CHAPTER V

THE ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE

Probably the greatest single effect upon the policy of France under de Gaulle's leadership have produced is a new awareness of the changed nature of our relationship with the Atlantic. The French President's remarks of January 14, 1962, indicated with clarity that every effort must be made to ensure that the Atlantic Alliance be recognized and understood by the United States. The relationship which had existed since 1945 became an independent political entity. The Atlantic Alliance has become a new force over the years. The situation which exists the commitment of the United States to Western Europe's defense is becoming more and more complex. France, as the leader of the movement in the "new Europe," gave voice to this understanding of European unity. Europe has a right to a greater voice in matters affecting her future destiny and in the control of those forces which could involve the continental states of Europe. In such an eventuality as a conflict between the two great nuclear powers, Europe could conceivably find herself caught between two great allies.

1. THE CHANGING SITUATION

There is today, within the Alliance, no great sense

of urgency, no feeling of fear or uncertainty which marked the 1949 period when NATO was brought into existence by a common need felt on both sides of the Atlantic. In this period, Western Europe needed the benefits accruing from a United States guarantee of their security, not only in the military-defense sphere, but also economically and psychologically as well. Under this protective "umbrella" of American deterrent forces and benevolent but absolute leadership, the Europeans were able to throw off their lethargy and prosper.

In 1949 and the early 1950's, the Soviet threat seemed most great in military terms. It was not too difficult to envision a hoard of Soviet tanks rolling Westward. Today the Soviet threat or challenge is in the field of economics and technology. The area of the Soviet menace is now removed from Western Europe and is centered in Southeast Asia. Also, in the '49-'50 period, the United States had a worldwide monopoly of atomic weapons which it could use, if need arose, in defense of its allies without fear of retaliation. Today, with the possession of mass destruction weapons by the U.S.S.R., there is considerable doubt expressed as to whether the U.S. would risk her own destruction in defense of Western Europe. All of these problems and changes in the international situation have led to an erosion in NATO's political unity and have ultimately weakened her military



of exposure, the feeling of loss or uncertainty which marked the 1945 period was brought into existence by a common need felt on both sides of the Atlantic. In this period, Western Europe passed the period known as the United States' period of "half recovery", not only in the military-economic sphere, but also economically and politically as well. Under this protective "umbrella" of American technical forces and personnel and political leadership, the European nations were able to show off their military and political progress.

In 1945 and the early 1950's, the Soviet Union seemed most proud in military power. It was not too difficult to envision a world of Soviet power rolling westward. Today the Soviet Union of course is in the field of technology and technology. The rate of the Soviet Union is now low, moved from Western Europe and is centered in Western Asia. Also, in the 1950-1960 period, the United States had a serious policy of atomic weapons which it could use, it could, in defense of the allies against fear of retaliation. Today, with the possession of more destructive weapons by the U.S.S.R., there is considerable doubt suggested as to whether the U.S. will still have its own position in defense of Western Europe. All of these problems and changes in the international situation have led to an erosion in NATO's political unity and have ultimately weakened the military

strength and resoluteness. The emphasis placed upon conventional arms for the defense of Western Europe in the 1960's does not in the least increase this "resoluteness" on the part of America's allies.

Today, Western Europe is physically capable and economically sound enough to be able to provide for her own conventional defense. What appears to be lacking is the ability and willingness to accept a greater share of the burden for her own defense under the present organization, NATO, in spite of the United States balance of payments deficit. The United States appears not to comprehend the Europeans' desire to want to be able to look after their own defense or their motives for this.

There is in Europe a curious mixture of this desire to take care of themselves coupled with an inordinate lack of enthusiastic support for large or expanded military efforts. In a report prepared for the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in 1960, it was stated that, except for Britain and Denmark, there was a large amount of "egocentricity" in Europe. When extended to worldwide problems and the cold war confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Europeans were generally "unwilling to accept either a passive role on the one hand or on the other the responsibility for working with the United States in meeting Soviet

strategy and objectives. The proposals placed upon countries should show the degree of progress made in the 1970's and also in the last decade. The "assessment" on the part of America's allies.

Today Western Europe is largely capable and economically sound enough to be able to provide for its own conventional defense. What appears to be lacking is the ability and willingness to accept a greater share of the burden for the new defense under the current system, and, in spite of the United States policy of payment for defense. The United States appears not to comprehend the European desire to be able to look after their own defense or their allies for this.

There is in Europe a national mind of this desire to take care of themselves coupled with an increasing loss of confidence in the support for large or regional military efforts. In a report prepared for the U.S. Foreign Service in 1960, it was stated that, among the British and French, there was a large amount of "apathy" in Europe. Even when it was the problem of the cold war, cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. was not particularly good. It was generally unwilling to accept either a greater role on the one hand or on the other the responsibility for working with the United States in making major



attacks elsewhere."<sup>1</sup> In the main, their concern lay with their own particular problems. When their interests did fall outside Europe it usually lay "exclusively in areas of their respective former of [sic] present colonial holdings."<sup>2</sup>

But there is in Europe an understanding that Europe has the capabilities to do more in its own behalf than it has in the past. It is in no small measure due to de Gaulle that Western Europe is becoming more concerned about its future under United States protection, and is looking for a greater measure of security closer to home. This, as de Gaulle has said many times, can only come from within. Europe must one day look to the time when she must furnish her own defenses, conventional and nuclear, and cease her reliance upon non-European powers.

## II. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO EUROPE

The United States commitment to the defense of Western Europe, as expressed in the NATO Pact, has been, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, irrevocable. There is no reason to believe that this commitment will be adversely affected by de Gaulle's attitude toward the alliance

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<sup>1</sup>Allan Crockett, et al., Report of Study Group on Problems of European Security, United States Foreign Service Institute (Washington, 1960), p. 5. (Unpublished.)

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

attitude is...<sup>1</sup> in the main, their conduct is also  
 their own responsibility. When their interests are  
 all mixed together it is hardly to be expected that they will  
 their respective forms of (a) present colonial holdings.<sup>2</sup>  
 The view is in Europe an understanding that Europe  
 has the responsibility to do more in the world than it  
 has in the past. It is no small matter that the world  
 that Western Europe is becoming more concerned about its  
 future under United States protection, and is looking for a  
 greater degree of security closer to home. This, as it  
 seems to me, is the only way to keep the world from  
 Europe must not say that it is the only way to keep  
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## II. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO EUROPE

The United States commitment to the defense of  
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 adversely affected by the United States' efforts toward the Middle

<sup>1</sup> Alan Woodhead, *et al.*, *Journal of World Affairs*  
 Volume of European Security, United States Foreign Relations  
 Committee (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 2. (unclassified)

and American leadership. While the substance of the U.S. commitment will endure, the form may take a different road than in the past. In this area, United States policies may be strongly affected by Gaullist actions and attitudes. The day may soon come when, because of some external though related factor, such as the balance of payments deficit, the United States may want to withdraw a majority of its forces from Europe. Such a move in the face of de Gaulle's pronouncements that America may not be counted upon for the defense of Western Europe would be tantamount to admitting that he was right. It certainly would make the real factors for such a move almost unexplainable to our allies.

NATO and the United States guarantee which backs it has served usefully in the past. It has kept Europe secure from creeping Soviet encroachment in the late 1940's and 1950's (though there are those who argue that no such threat really existed despite the evidence to the contrary), and permitted the Europeans to develop a more peaceful state of mind which was certainly conducive to their rapid and effective recovery. NATO's existence was also a guarantee to Europe that the New World would aid the Old in peacetime.

As a mutual defense arrangement, NATO is not in dispute in most European countries, save France. Most agree that so long as there is a possible threat from the Soviet bloc in the future, NATO is a practical necessity in acting





as a deterrent. Then again, there is just nothing that is on the scene which would be able to replace it, despite its drawbacks. The motivating force needed to overcome the inertia which has been built up over the years in the acceptance of the alliance simply cannot be generated in the present world situation to develop a new scheme of alliance. This is especially true in what would most certainly be an intransigent French position.

President Kennedy, in regard to expressed European fears that the United States might some day abandon its commitment to Western Europe, stated:

But I want to emphasize tonight, to all the peoples of the Western Alliance, that I strongly believe that such fears are folly. The United States cannot withdraw from Europe, unless and until Europe should wish us gone. We cannot distinguish its defenses from our own. We cannot diminish our contributions to Western security or abdicate the responsibilities of power. . . . And our policies in Europe today are founded on one deep conviction: that the threat to Western Europe and freedom is basically indivisible, as is the Western deterrent to that threat.

The United States, therefore, is committed to the defense of Europe, by history as well as by choice.<sup>3</sup>

This was the theme of President Kennedy's 1963 visit to Western Europe. De Gaulle accepts President Kennedy's

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<sup>3</sup>"President Kennedy's Address to National Trade Conference in Washington," U.S. News and World Report, LII (May 28, 1963), 64.

as a statement. Then again, there is just nothing that is  
 on the scene which would be able to replace it, despite the  
 fact that the existing order would be replaced by the  
 order which was then built up over the years in the  
 course of the almost fifty years of development in the  
 present world situation to develop a new system of relations.  
 This is especially true in that world now existing in an  
 increasingly tense position.

President Kennedy, in order to express European  
 leaders that the United States might have a different view  
 of the situation in Europe, stated:

Let me be very clear, to all the  
 people of the Western Hemisphere, that I strongly  
 believe that we must act boldly. The United  
 States cannot withdraw from Europe, Africa and  
 Asia. These are the areas in which we must be  
 engaged. It is not our duty to leave them  
 to the discretion of others. We must  
 maintain our commitment to Western Hemisphere  
 affairs. The responsibility of power is  
 not our policy in Europe today. We must be  
 very clear. That the threat to Western Europe  
 and freedom is not only real, but it is  
 a threat to the future of the world.

The United States, therefore, is committed to  
 the defense of Europe, by treaty as well as by  
 choice.

This was the theme of President Kennedy's 1961 visit  
 to Western Europe. In United Nations President Kennedy's

<sup>1</sup> President Kennedy's address to the United States Congress  
 in Washington, D.C., June 25, 1961.



statements of good faith but, at the same time, rejects the idea that the actions of one President will be binding upon a future American Chief Executive. There have been too many proofs of this in the past, in the change from the strategy of massive retaliation to expanded conventional forces, and in the pre-emptory manner in which we canceled Skybolt and left the British without an independent force. No American President can predict the judgments or changes which his successors may chose in an era of rapidly-changing and expanding technology and knowledge. For this reason, France wants her own independent nuclear force. Because ". . . NATO has been undeniably successful in its role as the major vehicle of the United States presence in Europe,"<sup>4</sup> de Gaulle wants the American (and British) dominance of the alliance to end and United States influence in Europe to be withdrawn.

The hope which the United States had of broadening the NATO alliance into areas of greater cooperation by means of a true Atlantic Partnership fell into abeyance after de Gaulle's January, 1963, pronouncements. Just as the movement towards greater political federation in Europe had been brought to a halt by France's unyielding position, so too has the concept of broadening the base for greater political and economic cooperation in the Atlantic Area. Without

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<sup>4</sup>Crockett, op. cit., p. 6.



France, neither scheme for greater interdependence among nations would be practicable nor workable.

NATO, then, will probably remain primarily a military alliance until some answers are found to satisfy de Gaulle's objections. It is not likely then that in the near future "the community of interest which brought the NATO countries into a defensive military alliance can be broadened to include within NATO itself, the conduct of an economic and social counteroffensive."<sup>5</sup> This statement, although set out in 1960, is as equally valid today.

There is today an improved area of political consultation in NATO, certainly better than that which existed in 1956. However, there is still the feeling that it is more an exchange of information after the event (as was the case in the Cuban confrontation), than a joint participation by all the members in policy decisions of major importance. The independent action taken unilaterally by the United States in the Cuban Crisis of 1962 weakened the aura of whatever political consultation NATO had until then possessed. Great Britain, France, and Germany all resented, to a certain extent, the way the United States handled the situation. If the crisis were as "real" as it was presented, then they all

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<sup>5</sup> Eileen R. Donovan, et al., The Future of NATO: An Outline of Probable Strengths and Weaknesses Over the Next Ten Years, United States Foreign Service Institute, Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy (Washington, 1960), p. 2. (Unpublished.)





risked possible nuclear destruction as a result of American policy decisions in which they had shared no part, except ex post facto. This considerably strengthened those in Europe who felt fully justified in pursuing their own independent foreign and defense policies. While the United States may have really believed that the full revelation of what had transpired in Cuba would impress our NATO partners and permit us to emphasize the importance of centralized policy direction and control of the West's nuclear deterrent forces, it meant to our allies that their acceptance of the American doctrine meant the end of national nuclear forces. This was not to be the case, especially in regard to France.

### III. FUTURE AFFECTS UPON THE ALLIANCE

It was a fashionable pastime in 1962 to declare the NATO alliance "dead." Yet, it has endured the severest strains and survives today despite its critics and its inherent faults. The alliance has weathered storms of great political consequence, fissiparous nationalistic drives, and monopolistic policy direction. That NATO will continue as a military alliance seems a reasonable assumption. There is nothing, now, capable of replacing it and as long as there is any danger from Soviet Russia and her satellites, some sort of alliance would seem prudent to serve as a deterrent to this possible threat. That NATO is overdue for alteration





to reflect the actual status of Europe's power (and France's) in relation to that of the 1949-1950 era would also seem to be a reasonable assumption.

France is as much a part of NATO as she is of Western Europe. Without France there can be no real defense or organization for the defense of Western Europe. It is unthinkable that the other fourteen members of NATO could plan around French intransigence and ignore her in attempting to achieve security in Western Europe. As President Kennedy has stated, Western Europe is vital to United States security; therefore, we must maintain and accept France as part of the alliance.

To acquiesce to some of de Gaulle's demands in regard to the alliance and permit France to play a greater part in the NATO structure and policy direction would be a recognition of her role on the Continent and in the "new" Europe. It would not be a submission to de Gaulle's will but a recognition instead of the changed nature of relationships among the members of the alliance.

It is expected that de Gaulle will again renew his demands and challenge the Anglo-American directorate of the alliance to grant France substantial revisions in the control and command structure. Perhaps this time, some of his points will be granted. There may even be a French General installed as SACEUR. As de Gaulle remarked in his press



conference of July 29, 1963

. . . for the French Government, important changes must be made in the conditions of its means of participating in the alliance, for this organization was built on the basis of integration, which no longer is of any value for us.<sup>6</sup>

In line with the French President's greater aims, he expects and wants American influences out of Europe entirely. He cannot achieve this by demanding alterations of a mild nature at this time. However, before 1969 or by this date at the latest, when the NATO Treaty comes up for renewal, de Gaulle can make his price so high that the alliance will become invalid. At such time, armed with her own independent nuclear force, de Gaulle or his successor can try again for a Franco-Russian alliance in Europe's name. In the light of the Soviet's growing troubles with China, such an agreement might be acceptable, especially so if the Europeans are no longer tied to United States policy. Such a course of action would be conditional upon the failure of the United States to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union before France and Europe have their opportunity to be heard. De Gaulle believes in a detente or an entente which will bring a refreshing change to East-West relations but when such a day comes, "France expects to make constructive

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<sup>6</sup>Press Conference of President de Gaulle in The New York Times, July 30, 1963.



... for the French Government, important changes must be made in the conditions of the names of persons registered in the records, for the registration was built on the basis of integration, which is contrary to the value for us.

IN THE COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
IN RE: THE ESTATE OF JAMES EARL RAY, JR.  
JAMES EARL RAY, JR., Plaintiff,  
vs.  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

proposals concerning the peace and equilibrium and destiny of Europe."<sup>7</sup>

Any change in the alliance will, of course, have its affects upon U.S. forces committed to NATO, especially if such changes are in the area of Commands. It would be hard to visualize the United States maintaining our forces in Western Europe at considerable cost, under a reorganized NATO structure in which America would have less than a predominant voice in their use within NATO.

In the area of nuclear weapons development, it appears that nothing can be done to halt de Gaulle's program for France, except worldwide disarmament. Until such an agreement is reached, France will continue to work for an independent nuclear capability. If the United States were to offer France the assistance she requires, with no strings attached, de Gaulle would accept, but he would under no circumstances abandon his goals for a modicum of aid or even increased stature in the alliance. As he explained at Grenoble on October 7, 1960:

France intends that her defence should be national in character, in particular as far as nuclear weapons are concerned; France must have her own weapon. If by misfortune, atomic bombs were to be launched in the world, France intends that none should be launched from the side of the free world without her consent.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>France and the European Community, Occasional Paper





De Gaulle desires that France, then, be consulted in all matters affecting the West's policies throughout the world, for he does not want her to be drawn into any situation against her will which could prove disastrous for her in its consequences.

In regard to the sharing of information and the giving of nuclear aid to France, the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, in a study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, argued:

The United States should make available to its principal European allies the appropriate nuclear capabilities in order to avoid costly duplication of development effort and the diversion of scarce resources from the creation of adequate ground forces.<sup>9</sup>

A similar study prepared by The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University, agreed that if her allies are determined to proceed with their own programs, the United States should provide technical assistance to avoid costly duplication of effort.

Because independent allied strategic forces can add little to the deterrent supplied by the U.S. strategic forces and because they tend to divert allied efforts from more pressing needs of local defense, the United

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No. 11 (London: Political and Economic Planning, 1961), pp. 14-15.

<sup>9</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Western Europe," U.S. Foreign Policy Study No. 3, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 214.

On nearly all issues that have been discussed in  
all sessions throughout the week's sessions throughout the  
week, the Board has been able to find common ground and  
come up with a plan which would be a basis for the  
in its recommendations.

In regard to the timing of the meeting and the  
ing of the meeting will be through the Foreign Policy  
Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, in a study  
group for the Committee on Foreign Relations, and

The United States should make available to its  
business community the knowledge and  
capabilities in order to avoid costly duplication  
of development effort and the diversion of scarce  
resources from the creation of economic growth  
factors.

A similar study conducted by the Washington Center for Foreign  
Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University, agrees that it  
has since the beginning of the study with their own programs,  
the United States would provide technical assistance to  
avoid costly duplication of effort.

Recent Commission staff studies have shown that  
little in the development of the U.S. economy  
has been able to meet the demand for  
from the growing needs of local markets, the United

See: "Economic, Political and Social Trends, 1961",  
pp. 16-17.

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign  
Relations, "Foreign Policy Study No. 1",  
New Congress, 1st Session (1961), Government Printing  
Office, Wash., D. C.

States should discourage the establishment or extension of independent nuclear forces. If our allies cannot be dissuaded from this objective, the United States should attempt to channel their efforts into mobile or otherwise protected retaliatory systems. For this purpose, it would be useful for the United States to share technical information concerning the construction of hardened missile sites and solid missile propellants with its allies.<sup>10</sup>

If the United States cannot stop de Gaulle in his bid for nuclear forces, then it appears that the only alternative the United States has to attempt to keep it under control as much as possible and give France the information we feel we can release without hurting her own security. Much of the information and assistance we would furnish France is certainly possessed by the Soviet Union so there would not appear to be much risk in this direction. Some means can and should be found to recognize France's role as the keystone of the NATO alliance on the Continent and the augmented prestige which she has achieved from her development of a nuclear capability unaided.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," U.S. Foreign Policy Study No. 8, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 681.

<sup>11</sup>Crockett, op. cit., p. 10.





## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

France, after the end of World War II, had one prerequisite in the pursuit of her foreign policy and that was the search for recognition of her status as a Great Power by the victorious allies. Those who directed her course in international affairs realized that for France to be the initiator of events and not the victim she had to seek the status as an equal with the Big Three.

With the split in the wartime alliance among the Big Powers, France began to take a more important part in the proceedings of the postwar era in Europe, because both the East and the West sought her support initially. For a temporary period, at least, France was permitted to nourish her dream of acting the role of mediator between the forces of the East and the West which were growing farther apart. The width of the split that developed, however, forced France to abandon her idea of acting as the cohesive element in this divisive postwar period. Gradually she found that it was not possible to side step the growing conflict between the two Great Power blocs, and France was forced to choose between the East and the West for the sake of sheer survival.

During the late 1940's, French leaders found that their "objectives proved unrealistic because of the lack

## STANLEY AND CONCLUSION

Stanley, after the end of World War II, had the reputation as the possessor of her foreign policy and that was the secret for recognition of her status as a great power by the victorious allies. Those who directed her course in international affairs realized that for France to be the initiator of events and not the victim she had to seek the means as an equal with the big three.

With the split in the western alliance among the big powers, France began to take a more important part in the reshaping of the post-war era in Europe, because both the East and the West sought her support initially. For a few years, France was permitted to maintain the status of a great power, the role of mediator between the forces of the East and the West which were growing in the sphere. The split in the alliance that developed, however, forced France to abandon her role of acting as the mediator in this divisive post-war period. Gradually she found that it was not possible to play the growing conflict between the two great power blocs, and France was forced to choose between the East and the West for the sake of her survival.

During the last 1940's, France became more and more isolated in the world, and she was forced to choose between the East and the West for the sake of her survival.



of adequate national power to support them."<sup>1</sup> The result was that France, by 1947 and 1948, had come to depend more and more upon American military and economic aid to make up for what she lacked and to bolster her internally against communist machinations. While such aid was needed and, to a certain extent, greatly appreciated, another side of the French political personality felt a certain sense of humiliation and loss of pride by virtue of the fact that France was so dependent. More galling, perhaps, was the fact that her aid was coming from the "Anglo-Saxons," the only ones which were capable of meeting France's needs.

In advocating the movement for European unity, France sought to regain her position as a mediator and retain at least partial control over a revitalized and economically resurgent Germany. In this movement, France believed that she would assume the role of the "natural" leader. France played a leading role in the development of European institutions in the economic, political, and military sphere. This was due, in no small part, to her desire to create organizations that would be able and strong enough to control Western Germany.

As part of her security requirements, France, in

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<sup>1</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France, Troubled Ally, DeGaulle's Heritage and Prospects (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 22.

of adequate financial power to support them.<sup>1</sup> The result was that France, by 1917 and 1918, had come to depend more and more upon American military and economic aid to make up for what she lacked and to bolster her industrially against communist revolution. While such aid was needed and, to a certain extent, greatly appreciated, another side of the French political personality felt a certain sense of humiliation and loss of pride by virtue of the fact that France was so dependent. Here, perhaps, was the fact that was not coming from the "people's movement," the only ones which were capable of meeting France's needs.

In advocating the movement for European unity, France sought to regain her position as a leader and retain it. France's political leaders were a revitalized and economically vigorous minority. In this movement, France believed that she would assume the role of the "natural" leader. France played a leading role in the development of European unity, not only in the economic, political, and military spheres. This was done, as we shall see, to her benefit to create organizations that would be able and strong enough to support western Germany.

As part of her economic development, France, in

<sup>1</sup> Edgar A. Snodgrass, Jr., France, French Aid, and America's Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 24.

company with Great Britain, wanted the United States to be bound to Western Europe in some type of peacetime military commitment. The United States reaction to such a proposal was the same as that embodied in the Marshall Plan offer. The Europeans were asked first to demonstrate that they not only were willing to act in their own behalf but were also ready to accept such a task. Thus, it was that the Brussels Treaty came into being with its quasi-military organization which proved an important first step in paving the way in the United States for an expanded United States commitment to Western Europe. The NATO Pact which was the culmination of this effort emerged a year later in 1949.

On the question of German rearmament, the French were hard pressed to find an acceptable solution to meet their security requirements. They were severely pressured by the United States into accepting the concept of a West German force as being vital to the defense of Western Europe and, consequently, France. The Plevan Plan of 1950 was the solution which the French accepted most readily when the danger of Soviet aggression seemed so imminent. It was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954 because of a number of factors which found the Gaullists and Communists in an unnatural alliance. The failure of the EDC was due partially to the lessening of tension which followed the death of Stalin in 1953 and the almost simultaneous announcement of the Soviet



company with direct interests, which the United States to be found in several types of economic military commitments. The United States seemed to have a proposal with the aim of that included in the Marshall Plan offer. The European war ended first to demonstrate that they are only able willing to act in whole new habits but were also ready to accept such a task. Thus, it was that the proposals clearly came into being with the quasi-military organization which proved an important first step in paving the way for the United States for an expanded United States commitment to Europe. The 1945 event which was the admission of this event marked a point later in 1945.

On the question of German rearmament, the French will have pressed to that an explicit solution for most their security requirements. They were finally persuaded by the United States that accepting the concept of a West German force as being vital to the interests of Western Europe and, accordingly, Western. The 1945 plan of 1945 was the main idea which the French accepted but finally came the danger of Soviet expansion moved as imminent. It was rejected by the French Politburo in 1945 because of a number of factors which found the American and Communist in an unresolvable alliance. The failure of the EUO was due partially to the increasing of tensions which followed the death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent development of the Soviet

acceptance of a policy of "coexistence." Equally a factor were the French commitments in Asia and Algeria which were heavily draining French resources, men, and material. There was, in addition, the factor of the general political division that existed in France on matters of foreign policy and which expressed itself in the sine die vote on the EDC.

After 1954, the Fourth Republic dissolved itself in the acid of immobilisme. From 1954 to 1958, the main goal of French foreign policy was to compensate for the nation's internal weaknesses. The mainspring of its policy remained the insistence of its status as a Great Power with "all the attributes and prerequisites pertaining thereto."<sup>2</sup> The United States position, which was to maintain exclusive nuclear monopoly within the Atlantic alliance and prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms, made the Government of the Fourth Republic realize that it would have to back up France's diplomatic ventures with nuclear weapons whose control was solely in the hands of the French. Thus, the French drive for a nuclear "voice" was begun under the Fourth Republic's initiative, and it was this "start" which de Gaulle became heir to in 1958.

What is most readily apparent here is that there has been a definite continuity in French foreign policy in the

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 246.

...the ... of ...

the end of 1941. From 1941 to 1945, the end of the war, the policy was to compensate for the nation's material resources. The rebuilding of the policy remained the objective of the nation as a whole from 1945 to the present and has been a great success.

United States position, which was an important objective  
designed to support within the Atlantic Alliance and present for  
protection of common goals, and the Government of the  
United States would not be able to

1. The first of these is the fact that the Government has been unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out its policy of maintaining the value of the pound at its pre-war level. This has been due to a variety of factors, including the fact that the Government has been unable to secure the necessary foreign exchange to finance its policy.

There is some reason to believe that the results of the study are not generalizable to other countries. The study was conducted in a developing country, and the results may be different in a developed country. The study was also conducted in a specific population, and the results may be different in other populations.



transition from the Fourth to the Fifth French Republics. While there have been changes in personnel, institutions, and leadership, the foreign policy goals of close cooperation with West Germany, the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability, and a greater representation and voice in the policies of NATO are basically unchanged.

The Suez crisis of 1956, in which the French shared the onus with Great Britain, almost resulted in the collapse of the alliance. In this operation, France clearly demonstrated that her interests superseded her concern for the alliance. Indeed, the alliance was for France a great disappointment in that the "special relationship," which had grown up between Britain and the United States and was very predominant in the NATO structure, refused to recognize France's global commitments and thus give her an adequate voice in NATO policy direction. France, in her Suez venture, sought to ease Britain away from the United States by bringing her into closer association with France. Furthermore, she hoped to build up the waning prestige of her battered armed forces which had met with little but reversals since Indo-China. The subsequent failure of the French and British gamble in Egypt was marked by the British rush to repair their "special-relationship" with the United States, the result of which left France in a worse position than before in the alliance. France was now a complete outsider in the

American from the French in the 19th century Republic.  
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 the world with great Britain, almost resulted in the collapse  
 of the alliance. In this operation, French clearly demon-  
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 alliance. Indeed, the alliance was not a great dis-  
 appointment as that the "special relationship" which had  
 grown up between Britain and the United States and not very  
 pronounced in the NATO structure, turned to recognize  
 France's special commitment and thus give her no doubt  
 value in NATO policy decisions. France, in her own words,  
 sought to make Britain away from the United States by bringing  
 her into closer association with France. In contrast, the  
 need to build up the United States of the Western world  
 France which had not little was necessary since 1945.  
 China. The emergence of the French and British  
 alliance in 1945 was marked by the British view of the  
 French "special relationship" with the United States. The 45-  
 year of which left France in a worse position than before in  
 the alliance. France was not a complete outsider in the

alliance while the British and American relationship grew ever more secure. French policy seemed, after this operation, to be concentrated upon delaying as long as possible her decline which seemed impending. Thus, France was forced to rely upon NATO for her security during this period of political immobilisme for she quickly discovered that neutralism was no longer possible and an agreement with the Soviet Union was out of the question especially after the successful beginning of the rapprochement with the Government of the Federal German Republic.

As previously stated, de Gaulle's Atlantic policies cannot be divorced from his European policies. He sees for France the dominant role in the "new" Europe, which he hopes will develop along the lines of confederation rather than political federation. Whether the present European movement has traveled too far along federal lines for de Gaulle to be able to turn it back or reshape in the image he desires, only time will tell. The Europe of tomorrow, organized along French lines, will become the political, economic, and military balance between the East and the West. It will, in fact, become the mediator, the "third force," which de Gaulle truly believes is France's rightful heritage. This future role for France is a long-range program which de Gaulle has no real hope of completing in his allotted life span. His mission is rather to gain for France influence



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and leadership in the "new" Europe and to get her started along the road to pre-eminence in the "third force" which will eventually and naturally emerge, so that nothing can stop the course of events. In 1961, de Gaulle summed up his program:

We shall do what we have to do, we shall help to build up Europe, which, by confederating its nations can and must - for the sake of mankind - become the greatest potential economic, military, and cultural power that has ever existed. We shall help this assembled Europe and its daughter America to re-organize their alliance to better defend the free world and to act together in all parts of the earth.<sup>3</sup>

France's nuclear program has been termed by the United States divisive, inimical to the Western alliance, based upon distrust of America's good intentions, and prone to obsolescence. The United States has shown little understanding of the political and psychological motives behind the European independent nuclear programs.

The American desire to defend the Atlantic Area by centralized control of the West's nuclear forces and policy direction, presents our allies with a dilemma. Few in Europe are in agreement with the United States on the feasibility of a purely conventional force. Additionally, they want a larger share in determining their fate within alliance policies.

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<sup>3</sup>Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "DeGaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," International Organization, XV (Summer, 1961), 349.

and particularly in the "new" nations and in the "new" states along the front of the "new" world. In the "new" world, all economic and political interests, to that extent, are being kept the same as in the "old" world. In 1944, the United Nations was created.

We again repeat we have to do, we shall have to build up Europe, which, by contributing to the nations and states - not the sake of nations - because the greater political economic, military, and cultural power than any other nation. We shall have to build up the United States and the United States to the organization of the United Nations. We shall have to build up the world and to be together in all parts of the world.

The United Nations program has been created by the United Nations division, divided in the United Nations, based upon the United Nations's good intentions, and some to cooperation. The United States has shown little understanding of the political and psychological motives behind the European integrated market program. The United States is divided in the Atlantic area by the political interests of the United States and policy directed towards the United States with a system. The United States are in agreement with the United States in the least likely to a purely commercial basis. The United States want a large amount of international trade within Europe and a large amount of international trade within Europe.



The most recent use of the West's deterrent threat, in the Cuban Crisis, taught the Europeans two valuable lessons. Europe, without nuclear forces of its own, faced the threat of becoming involved in a nuclear war without being consulted. Further, the settlement of the issues at stake was achieved by the two Great Nuclear Powers. The country most concerned, Cuba, which possessed only conventional weapons of its own, did not have a voice in the negotiations. The parallel for the Europeans was too obvious not to be understood.

The incentive for nuclear weapons, on a national basis, cannot be explained or assessed solely in terms of their military value. Even a small nuclear force can be effective for the purposes of bargaining, if only on a limited scale. In this connection, it is interesting to compare the U.S. and European views of de Gaulle's goals and his methods of achieving them. In the United States, his "intransigent" attitude is condemned, and there is a tendency to blame all his actions upon his folie de grandeur. While it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that to de Gaulle, national prestige is important, his entire policy is not based upon this or his stubborn pride. As Walter Lippmann observed, the contest which de Gaulle is waging is "power politics played by the master of the game."

Many observers in the United States continue to

The most serious one of the world's political problems, in the opinion of the author, is the question of the balance of power. It is a question which has been the subject of much discussion and debate for many years. The balance of power is a system of relations between states in which no one state is so powerful as to be able to impose its will on the others. The system is based on the principle of self-interest. Each state seeks to increase its power and to prevent any other state from becoming too powerful. The system is a delicate one, and it is often in danger of breaking down. The author believes that the balance of power is the only way to maintain peace in the world. He argues that if one state becomes too powerful, it will eventually become a threat to the others. The only way to prevent this is to maintain a balance of power. The author also discusses the role of the United Nations in maintaining the balance of power. He believes that the United Nations is a necessary institution, but it is not sufficient by itself. It must be supported by the great powers of the world. The author concludes that the balance of power is the only way to maintain peace in the world.

The incentive for nuclear weapons, on a national level, cannot be explained as a result of the desire for their military value. Even a small nuclear force can be effective for the purpose of deterrence. It is only on a limited scale. In this connection, it is interesting to compare the view and attitude of the United States and its methods of achieving them. In the United States, the "deterrence" attitude is condemned, and there is a tendency to blame all the nations upon the United States. While it would be a mistake to overlook the fact that the United States is a superpower, its policy is not based upon this as its guiding principle. In Japan, however, the concept which the United States is trying to impose is based upon this as its guiding principle. The author believes that the United States is trying to impose its will on the world, and this is a mistake. He argues that the United States should not try to impose its will on the world, but should try to maintain a balance of power. The author concludes that the balance of power is the only way to maintain peace in the world.

regard France's Force de Frappe simply in military terms and gloss over its political implications. In Europe, however, it is almost universally accepted that this French force is motivated more by political than military considerations. As the United States has found out, we are not going to make much headway with de Gaulle by continually emphasizing the negligible value which this force has in comparison to our nuclear contribution to the West's deterrent, or by pointing out that it serves only to muddle up American strategy for Europe's defense.

The allies and the French have another incentive in developing their nuclear forces. They see such a force as not only an aid to bargaining with the U.S.S.R. but also as a means to gain greater influence over American actions.

The French see, in accepting the American thesis on independent nuclear forces, a surrender of their program which would be tantamount to resigning forever from the defense of her own security. It would mean, in their eyes, the abandonment of Europe's defense to the promises of not just one American President, as de Gaulle stated in rebuttal to President Kennedy's speech in Berlin in 1963, but to all future Presidents. Such a dependency would transform Europe into a satellite of the United States instead of a partner.

One of two things are likely to happen in the current situation. America's allies will realize the importance and





necessity of coordinating their forces with ours or they will assume a larger, major burden of their own defense which, in the conventional field, is what the United States would like to see happen.

In the area of sharing any nuclear command within NATO with the Europeans, the United States will have to prove that it is willing to go a lot farther in this direction than it has in the past if it ever hopes to have the Europeans abandon their plans for independent forces. As yet, the United States has not advanced any concrete proposals for a multi-national or multilateral force concept which will meet the requirements of the Europeans.

Had United States policies in the past been more realistic and had they taken into consideration the very real fears, criticisms and objections expressed by the Europeans, the present difficulty might have been avoided. Instead, we chose to brush aside our allies' criticisms whether they were valid or not, and we dismissed as irrelevant their arguments in regard to our nuclear and conventional defense policies for the alliance.

Europe has now found itself and insists that it be heard. While some European concepts may not be technically feasible, they, at least, merit the consideration of being evaluated in terms of the "new" Europe and not against the Europe of 1949. If it can, at long last, be recognized that

necessity of maintaining their forces with one or two  
 other means of transport, which would be their own defense  
 units, in the conventional field, in what the United States  
 would like to be known as the "conventional field".  
 In the case of having any other means of transport  
 which would be their own defense, the United States will have to  
 know that it is willing to go as far as it can in this  
 case, as far as the fact is that it is even more to have the  
 transport which would be their own defense, in the conventional  
 field, the United States has not advanced any concrete pro-  
 posals for a multi-national or multi-national force concept  
 which will meet the requirements of the transport.  
 And United States policies in the past have been  
 realistic and not very much into consideration for very  
 real terms, realistic and realistic support by the  
 transport, the present difficulty about how much  
 involved, we should be aware of the fact, criticism  
 should not be made on the fact, but we should be aware  
 that the transport is going to be a multi-national and con-  
 ventional defense policy for the alliance.  
 Europe has not been able to realize that it is  
 really, really some European countries may not be realistically  
 realistic, they, at least, really the possibility of being  
 realistic in terms of the fact, Europe has not realized that  
 Europe of itself is not a multi-national force concept.



a change has occurred and give it an opportunity to have its expression in the alliance, we have made progress along the right path.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the situation.

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